"DIE INTROJEKTIONS - UND DIE PROJEKTIONS MASCHINEN": FREUD, FERENCZI, AND THE IDEA OF MACHINIC TEMPORALITY[1]

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Psychoanalysis in its essence is, notwithstanding the undercurrent of the founding father's totemistic dominance, the development of joint theoretical efforts. Whereas to a German-speaking audience names like C. G. Jung, Wilhelm Fließ, and Otto Rank most certainly sound a lot more familiar than the Hungarian Sándor Ferenczi's, the latter, after Freud had successfully alienated most of his companions one way or the other, remained a loyal student and faithful correspondent up until his death in 1933. And the father of psychoanalysis took advantage of Ferenczi's dedication with making it evident that while he committed himself to theoretical questions and to produce another wave of speculations on metapsychological issues, Ferenczi was advised to attend to the problems posed by therapeutic praxis, and to devote himself to practical matters at hand[2]. Freud's appreciation of Ferenczi for his technical writings, however, did not mean that Ferenczi himself would have refrained from wildly innovative associations, sometimes going to extremes with his interpretations, as in the case of telepathy or bioanalysis[3], both of which are to be discussed in the second and third parts of this paper, respectively. Yet his ongoing interest in therapeutic methods approached from a practical perspective granted psychoanalysis numerous epistemological gains, ranging from the idea of introjection – which Freud rather skeptically commented upon, predicting meager effectiveness and short life-span for the concept[4] – through the theory of the "amphimixis," intermingling ontogenetic and phylogenetic viewpoints in investigating the mechanics of the psychic apparatus, to the different aspects and usages of transference in and out of analysis. Of course, these innovations had to be rediscovered after Ferenczi's death, and his most well-known disciple, and probably the only analyst towards whom Lacan articulated more than just witty insults, Michael Bálint did a pioneering job in reintroducing the aforementíoned concepts to post-Freudian psychoanalytic discourse.

The present contribution to the volume on the history of Hungarian cultural studies thus intends to present a small portion of Ferenczi's oeuvre with respect to his integration of evolutional theory into the psychical development of the individual. I aim to answer the questions: to what extent did he manage to grasp the various temporal processes (of repression, trauma, foreclusion etc.) with supposing intersections between onto- and phylogenesis, and by what means could he establish a link between the two? It will also be enlightened why he turned to hypostasizing the unconscious in a mechanical ecology, and most importantly, how he postulated a prosthetic historical condition for the sake of investigating the psyche. The year 1915 is exemplary in this regard, as it connected his quest for practicing bioanalysis on Lamarckian premises with his insights into the history of mechanics, along with an even stronger interest in occult phenomena. I will start with a reading of Ferenczi's criticism on Ernst Mach's essay *Kultur und Mechanik*, where he stumbles upon machines of introjection and projection, both of which have to do with tools, devices and apparatus being put forward either as extensions or as projections to the human body, depending on the subject's phase in development. Then in the second part, the applications of the prosthesis in psychoanalysis will be discussed via tracing Ferenczi's fascination with occultism and supernatural forces, while making use of the concept of "Dark Media" as has been suggested recently by Eugene Thacker. In the third and final section, Freud's and Ferenczi's preference for Lamarckism over Darwin's evolutionary theory will be elaborated, including an explanation of the necessity for establishing symbolic relations on machinic temporality.

PSYCHOANALYTIC MACHINERY

After his bitter personal and professional disappointment with Fließ, and the severe excommunication of Jung following a love-hate relationship aggravated by the latter's increasingly evident antisemitic utterances, Freud devoted most of his time and energy to pin down psychoanalysis to a clear-cut scientific basis once and for all. In this enterprise, Ferenczi proved to be a valuable asset and mediator, who constantly looked for allies as he felt the lack of acknowledgment towards the discipline in the Hungarian part of the Monarchy even more than Freud did in Vienna. For a short period, however, after the communist dictatorship raised to power and established the Council Republic in Hungary as an aftermath of the First World War, Ferenczi was awarded with the directorial position of a psychoanalytic clinic functioning as the Psychoanalytic Department of the University of Budapest, under the condition that his private praxis should be terminated, to which he willingly agreed[5]. Except for the time between April and August 1919, due to the lack of any official academic recognition Ferenczi spent most of his time around students who were eager to learn the new game in town called Freudism[6], while he also recruited open-minded mathematicians, physicists and high school teachers[7] for his cause with privately lecturing on the basics of psychoanalytic theory for a symbolic fee. As an eccentric intellectual, Ferenczi felt the constant urge to excavate[8] psychoanalytic themes in texts which were seemingly very far from having such an agenda. Each essay in the natural sciences which applied arguments established upon psychoanalytic axioms, even in an *avant la lettre* fashion, was a breath of fresh air to him. Among his "psychoanalyzing" readings, one of the most surprising experiments is his review of Mach's penultimate book.

Ferenczi's interpretation of the essay is characterized by the presupposition that Mach intended to establish a "general genetic technology" (allgemeinen genetischen Technologie)[9] via a scrutiny into the prehistory of mechanics. This mode of understanding, according to Ferenczi, coincides with the most basic psychoanalytic practice of all, that is coordinating the temporal horizon of analysis with respect to the primal scene.[10] Ferenczi also proposes that Mach has the means of transgression from the particular to the general[11] in common with psychoanalysis, and thus he constitutes a hypothetical origin for the subject in order for it to be grasped on an historical-theoretical level. In this fashion, not only did Mach manage to anticipate what later would have become Canguilhem's maxima, namely that the history of any scientific discipline could actually provide immeasurable epistemological gain to its practitioners,[12] but he also utilized the temporal horizon of the analytic situation to support his argument. Ferenczi, however, goes further than this by pointing out that Mach's goal of reconstructing an undoubtedly collective history (of mechanics) with its references to the primitive tool-user state of the human race, shares its causal basis with psychoanalysis's own act. Namely, the latter always tends to uncover a basic principle to trace the mechanics[13] and most eminently, of course, the breakdowns or defects of the psychic apparatus, just like Freud set the example for such techniques of temporal manipulation, a year earlier than Mach's essay was published, with the metapsychological paper *Remembering, Repeating and Working-through (Erinnern, Wiederholen, Durcharbeiten).* Each member of this triad contributes to a different aspect of regression to a primitive stage, of which Mach made good use in his pursuit of the origin of mechanics. That settled, mechanics can only ever be understood through its history, yet, continues Ferenczi, not by executing simple excavations, but with the help of strictly methodical genealogy-oriented research.[14] This standpoint would later become reinforced in psychoanalysis via Freud's chapter on the super-ego in *The Ego and the Id (Das Ich und das Es),* where he explicitly states that the individual ceaselessly relives those biological turning points of the human race, which are conserved by the Id in an archive-like fashion.[15] This way, Freud identifies phylogenetic processes with ontogenetic ones in order to avoid introducing the superego as residue of the Id's first object.[16] That eventually leads to the possibility of discovering the traces of the biological (and technological) progress of the species in individual psychological development, by means of focusing on techniques of iteration such as the ones mentioned in the title of his essay. Consequently, the basic principle required to engage with a historical constellation, be it the history of mechanics with respect to fire grates and firesticks,[17] or the history of society in relation to tribal complexes – as was laid down by Freud in Totem and Taboo – turns out to be the restoration of a prehistoric state of mind.

Yet Mach himself seems to omit individual efforts when it comes to the progress of machinery because his diagnosis has rested on his strong belief in a collective instinct, which, together with the state of affairs shaping everyday life back then, produced technological innovations. His idea of allocating the job of maintenance for mankind[18] is supported by devices that operate through carrying out circular movements: when activated, they produce a(n imaginary) close-circuit, this way contributing to the feeling that such tools possess an ecology of their own.[19] Opposing that conception, Ferenczi connects individual needs with collective commitments[20] in an historical fashion, such that, nowadays, we would say that he attempted to carry out an investigation into the genesis of the Anthropocene.[21] And while necessity, whether it is individual or collective, is no doubt a common factor for both Mach and Ferenczi as far as the motivation behind technological development is concerned, the latter's conception of it is in no way similar to how Freud formulated the disruption of the organism's homeostasis, and, thus, of its inner channeling of tension[22] in order to fulfill needs. Therefore necessity's actual importance in Ferenczi's essay does not lie in opening the way for the interaction between inner and outer milieus, the latter which in Mach's paper could be equated with the role humanity play in the history of machines, but rather in the fact that it utilizes cultural phenomena in order to trigger certain "technological ruptures."[23] According to this perspective, the development of the reality principle can neither be posed as an adaptation process, nor as the result of lucky accidents, but as the foundation of the two; Ferenczi enlightens the neuralgic point at the heart of the matter with taking Mach's exemplary Eskimos,[24] and commenting right away that the supposedly positive conditions which would somehow result in fortunate contingencies responsible for technological developments, are clearly missing in an arctic environment. Employing an historical perspective yet again, Ferenczi goes on to refer to the privation of mankind in the ice age,[25] when the odds were turned to the species' favor by human agency.[26] He proposes that the symbolic horizon, consisting of man's libidinally fueled interactions with objects[27] is precisely the blind spot of Mach's investigation, whereas that is the very horizon where the active agency of man is suspended. In other words, Ferenczi criticizes Mach's failure to notice that the most basic forms of handling objects are movements analogous to those which are exercised to provide satisfaction,[28] like rubbing (sticks together)[29] or thrusting.[30] That said, while Mach actually practices psychogenetic research, he dismisses Kapp's way of doing it; appropriating technological devices as unconscious projections. Mach argues for a less mystical formulation,[31] which he discovers in Herbert Spencer's conception of society being an extension of the individual's organic body.[32] Mach's approach, however, proves that in the end he does not question the pertinence of a certain type of media anthropology, considering that the history of machines is situated as a progress independent from the human condition and connected to man's physical development at the same time.

Ferenczi tries to employ an assertive attitude in this matter, legitimating both the Spencerian and Kappian theses, constituting a synthesis, not surprisingly in a temporal context: the determining factor behind categorizing machines either as projections or as extensions is the developmental phase which is reached by the individual. In this fashion, a certain device can act as an extension to the human body, if its function mainly consists of orienting its user throughout his wayfaring in the world of objects. Since this very apparatus also provide means of the psychic process introjection, which is the addressing of outer phenomena,[33] Ferenczi applies the label "introjection-machines" to them. Introjection-machines, according to him, thus, are those devices whose usage extends the "field of operation of the ego" (der Wirkungskreis des Ich) in its infantile phase,[34] and that coincides precisely with the usage of primitive tools like staves and hammers at the beginning of civilization. Ferenczi establishes this supposition in a manner that does not contradict Mach's own, since he preserves the latter's theorem concerning the urge to engage with objects of the outer milieu; the psychoanalyst simply tailors it to fit the developmental motif central to the physicist's argument.[35] In contrast to that, the formulation which is disregarded by Mach, namely, treating machinery as projection, as a matter of fact is the very precondition of arguing for an automaton with its own ecology. To pose such devices as exfoliations of the individual, hence as projection-machines that are hypostasized in their respective objecthood, made and maintained not by hand, but by human intelligence,[36] is, says Ferenczi, to equate them with the automatism of the unconscious, such that they ultimately gain their machinic agency via human development on individual and collective levels as well. These entities require a subject only to the extent of exploiting it for their manifestations.[37] Consequently, individual development and machinic progress inevitably coincide, operating complementarily to one another.

And that is the very aspect, to which Ferenczi draws the most attention in Mach's theory: while Mach admits that mechanics is simply incapable of demonstrating irreversible (i.e. thermodynamic) processes in an exact way,[38] Ferenczi reveals that the reason why mechanics is stuck with being mere idealization is indeed the exclusive linear development that is generated by a Machian model for the history of mechanics.[39] Consequently, historicizing mechanics as a means of abstraction itself, cannot give credible account of forms of interaction between man and machine, and fails to contribute to individual psychic processes, eventually undermining Mach's inquiry into both individual and collective phases of primordial development. Moreover, from the standpoint that Ferenczi occupies, it seems that Mach failed to establish a link between the two types of development. The lack of this very step taken becomes all the more inconsequent in the light of his application of a genital approach; Mach shares psychoanalysis's means by promoting the differentiation between the development of the individual and of culture in general, as being primarily a quantitative act: "Being born into a certain cultural phase, with just a short amount of time passed (similarly to the fetal state), we go through a vast development."[40] Ferenczi's argument against such a seemingly valid analogy is once more supported by Mach's ignorance towards recognizing the basic instincts lying at the heart of even the most complicated structures, as was already made clear by Freud, when he connected life to technology on developmental premises.[41] That is to say, in Mach's paper Ferenczi discovers the absence of a method that could draw the actual profit from psychoanalytic tropes employed as analogous to processes (e.g. infantile phase, dream, prehistory etc.). The correct way would be to promote such figures as mere intermediaries in order to reach those basic structures via which mankind with all their technological innovations can be investigated.[42] Against all his attempts to relate the prehistoric man to the infantile stage, Mach fails to render a temporal context which would suffice for the history of machinic interactions, unlike psychoanalysis with its ceaseless reordering of events, establishing its technique on iteration.[43] In Mach's book, temporality is posed to be as linear as his firesticks: "If our culture suddenly disappeared, then machines would be invented in the exact same order, starting from the tinkering of prehistoric men etc."[44]

Finishing with the reading of Ferenczi interpreting Mach's paper, it can be equitably stated that the former undoubtedly recognizes the latter's animistic way of thinking, and praises him for applying such a perspective on mechanics. Yet if it is primarily the spirit which makes machines operate, it is most unfortunate that Mach neglected individual development for the sake of securing the position of the janitor for mankind. Ferenczi can thus state that while the physicist can discover the soul in any machinery, the analyst in return reveals those processes in the psyche which are machinic;[45] simultaneously extending the field of human-machine progress via mechanizing the psychic apparatus. That said, Mach's disregard for the individual delimits the number of possible constellations for the history of machines. Unlike Mach's own, Ferenczi's theorem of *deus cum machina* exploits the inherently technological in the psychic apparatus which drives innovations on individual and collective levels simultaneously. Ferenczi, nevertheless, also carries out a peculiar theoretical ricochet by proposing temporal processes inherent to machines as means of excavating components of the psychic apparatus; this double bind between the history of mechanics and the mechanics of the unconscious can be posed as an *a priori* to the machinic hypostasis of the unconscious. Accordingly, the mutual influence between technology and mankind manifests whenever mechanics is set in motion: mechanics acquires history through the very work of the psyche, which in turn is investigated with the help of machinic processes. This constellation, however, transgresses the boundaries of simple abstractions; the very model starts to hypostasize in bodily discharges [Korpsifizierung],[46] producing occurrences, which are approached by Ferenczi using media of both mystical and technological origins.

THE CHARMS OF OCCULT PROSTHESES

Even those scholars, whose main research profile does not include psychoanalysis, might be familiar with at least the fact that Freud's opinion on occultism was mixed at best.[47] Jung's esoteric inclinations particularly aggravated him, but he encouraged Ferenczi to carry on with his experiments concerning telepathy[48] so as to explore domains previously hidden from psychoanalytic investigations. Opposing the mentalist transmission of thoughts and future-telling, Freud proposed the concept of overdetermination,

instead:[49] when he was a child, Freud chose 17 as his lucky number, which was back then interpreted by a mystic as the number of faithfulness, and then a couple of decades later Freud proposed to his wife-to-be on the 17th[50] This incident, however, might just belong to a type of occult faith present in psychoanalysis that dismisses contingencies on the basis of unconsciously motivated decisions.[51] Another example is Freud's trip to Paris after his wedding, during which he repeatedly heard the voice of his wife,[52] yet this case can also be interpreted as a wish-fulfilling hallucination instead of a mysterious sonic transference, or thought-insertion. Freud nonetheless could hear a voice without any prosthesis, and this peculiar type of transmission played its part in his relationship with Ferenczi too. The Hungarian analyst yearned for Freud's recognition while Freud himself struggled to keep his distance from him,[53] still haunted by the memories of his failed friendship with Fließ. Ferenczi refused to accept that Freud had not been the same person since the mistreatment of Emma Eckstein, and that he would never utterly open himself up to him. On top of that, a few years after they met for the first time, Freud found himself in a situation all too familiar to him: after Ferenczi realized that he had fallen in love with his fiancé's daughter Elma Pálos, he sent her to Vienna for analysis in 1912.[54] For Freud it was Beuer's affair with Anna O. (Bertha Pappenheim) all over again.

If we now proceed to elaborate on Ferenczi's fascination with occult phenomena which is closely linked to the occurrence of transference in analysis,[55] the conjecture can be put forward that he saw spiritism as a way-out of playing his part in Freud's self-imposed repetition of personal relations. Yet, on a less personal level the origin of his interest in the occult was actually related to the dynamism between the pleasure and reality principles. Lou Andreas-Salomé noted in her diary that her discussion with Freud had provided the insight that scientific phenomena in psychoanalysis could be posed as constant divergence from the former towards the latter.[56] For Ferenczi, this dynamism coincided with questioning – as was already demonstrated above with his review on Mach's paper – the basic principles of scientific practices. And it indeed included the experience granted to him by occultism, as the progress towards the reality principle had not excluded, but rather amplified supernatural factors. Because, according to Ferenczi, the supposed dominance of monism in the sciences is proposed as an act of projection via supplements (like the concept of materiality or atomism) that eventually misses its subject.[57] Ferenczi addresses this very confusion in experimental disciplines as the cause of neurosis in science, complementing its "dry atomism" and "rigorous materialistic take-on"[58] with his no less holist focus on the ego, exploiting the interconnections between technological progress and the mysticism of his time.[59] It can be justifiable after all, especially if we take into account that the rehabilitation of the mechanical world-view in the second half of the 19th century coincided with discovering new means of accessing the supernatural through somnambulism and hypnotism, which had clearly been amplified by the emergence of new media.[60]

The models for psychoanalytic acts (e.g. projection, introjection, transference) and techniques (such as hypnosis[61] and telepathy) rooted in spiritism were, however, not discredited by Freud entirely, as he primarily criticized the motives behind occultist exercises; he was dissatisfied with the spiritist disposition, mainly because it was not driven by the inadequacy of scientific axioms and practices but by the overall belief in a universal power.[62] And the reason lurking behind Freud prompting Ferenczi to continue his experiments with occult phenomena is that the former was certainly (more) capable of telling science from shenanigans, while the latter was eager to look for new methods applicable to psychoanalysis everywhere; this could at least count as an actual cooperation. Even though, hierarchy was still preserved via prosthetic means, since Freud's prosthesis was not only cut out for the modern individual,[63] but despite his constant complaints concerning his artificial lower jaw,[64] it also secured the position of the primordial father for him:[65] his legacy has persisted as the unconscious got mechanized by Ferenczi, then cybernetized by contemporary German media theory.[66] Yet it has seldom been proposed that Ferenczi himself, as well as his theoretical disposition might have played the role of an occult prosthesis to the "Freudian robot,"[67] presenting firsthand unconscious machinery. Because psychoanalysis does not simply differ from other scientific disciplines by means of simultaneously working with and working on apparatus, but also because it produces its own. This is why Eugene Thacker's newly introduced concept of "Dark Media" comes in handy here. Whereas Thacker's examples are mainly taken from pop culture, such as J(apanese)horror adapted to support the argument that horror movies, in general and since the birth of the genre, eminently thematize the usage of media within

the medium itself, his predominant goal remains, nonetheless, to explain how media can actually simulate means of interaction with phenomena below sensory thresholds.[68] Thacker distinguishes three types of practices for which he uses the umbrella term dark media, all three of them involving actual temporal disjunctions. While "dead media" enact the interplay between "an outmoded or outdated artifact and its still-active technical principle,"[69] that can be associated with the interconnections between the compact cassette and audio recording in general, or as in Thacker's example, between the *laterna magica* and visual sensation, "haunted media" as the second subtype of dark devices, cover cases when a still active object is utilized in a non-normative way. The third type of mediation carried out by "weird media" differs from the former because it is based on negation instead of cooperation. Weird mediation never negotiates peace between different ontological orders (i. e. natural and supernatural) but points to the unbridgeable rift, the original lack of compatibility between them. While Thacker states that the idea of haunted media principally distinguishes itself from the modern cybernetics-influenced conception of mediation first put forward in the 50's, one which always works with a single consensual reality,[70] his formulation of weird media does, nevertheless, come to terms with contemporary ideas, since the successful operations of weirdness mainly manifest through executing breakdowns and presenting glitches; as it will be later argued, Ferenczi's machines do something utterly similar. Apart from connecting these practices to spatiotemporal distortions, Thacker's most important conclusion is, however, that devices positioned as dark media do not mediate between addressers and addressees, and cannot be approached on the principle of coding and deciphering because they first and foremost enact protocols. They are capable of realizing such mediations since they operate not due to interactions between medium and object, but in the domain ruled by things;[71] supernatural phenomena in this regard provide an eminent example, as they implement entities and processes which can only be accessed via technological media, bringing back the 19th-century "mystic" sense of the word. This rehabilitation exercised by psychoanalysis is backed by mediated spectral occurrences that certainly share the features of psychoanalytic transference in a way that they also involve manipulations. The importance of manipulation here does not necessarily reside in its capability of producing inescapable illusions, but in the fact that it can be defined as a form of exercising control over a field established upon noise instead of tangible information: Freudian slips, misunderstandings, and distorted syntax. The weird phenomena of ghostly apparitions and voices from the "other side," equal those material-somatic phenomena in analysis that are inseparable elements of meaningful statements, and cannot be detached from the means of how such articulations are formulated. You cannot record one without the other because there does not exist a unique way of psychoanalytic filtering. This lack, nevertheless, does produce a singularity in psychoanalysis since it ultimately leads to the weirdness of mediation. Processes of decoding thus come to hold no real value: it is how the experience "out of reach" can be presented[72] what *matters*: "the hallucinations of madmen are not illusions per se, rather they are actual percepts originating from the outside world of objects and from other people's psyches; these can be accessed due to psychotics' psychological over sensibility."[73]

If we approach Ferenczi's machines by building upon this principle, introjection-machines provide a model for the phase of the separation between the ego-libido and the object-libido,[74] that is, when the first disruption of inner ecology occurs, with the organism reaching out to its outer milieu. In contrast to this, projection-machines pop up in a neurotic state, when the patient is stuck with the occult obsession that his thoughts and wishes are omnipotent,[75] and thus projects them to the world whenever he is engaged with objects. Therefore psychotics and neurotics with their machines, act like telepaths who can carry out mediation without any extra organs, yet who also are clearly backed up by devices functioning as extensions to their bodies, nevertheless.[76] Moreover, due to his interest in counter-transference,[77] Ferenczi regarded projection as a weird type of transmission, one that did not simply seek for objects to trigger interactions with them,[78] but by means of "active analysis" – a technique developed by him – projection could actually establish a psychic link between the analyst and the analysand. The almost telepathic force exercised by a projection-machine in this situation is "a wish which magically manifests even if in such a primitive form, via the materials accessible in and by the body […] in a way as, according to occultists, a medium can execute with a simple wish the 'apport' or 'materialization' of certain objects."[79] It is not by chance that Ferenczi avoids the term representation, as materiality more often than not can be accessed as

something deformed and weird in such interactions, like, for instance, the distorted body in therapeutic sessions, when the patient materializes the close-circuits of his psychic apparatus as somatic symptoms (e.g. as ticks, stuttering). Therefore the projected organs of the unconscious (as projection-machines) manifest in a fashion analogous to how the supernatural is traditionally addressed and brought forth in communication: always partially realized, in a spectral-immaterial deformation,[80] during mediating something otherwise inaccessible. This process is no longer dependent upon the idea of perfectibility, and sacrifices the demand for high-quality transmission, executing a regression in order to get a peek into the great beyond.

Before proceeding to those associations which are brought along by introjection- and projection-machines in a psychoanalytic context, first it has to be clarified that there existed a difference between the words "Apparat" and "Maschine" in Freud's time. The former covered devices that dealt with inscription techniques in general and were used for the transmission of messages in particular, whereas the latter mainly stood for machinery which was based on the principles of energy, hence machines that took after the steam engine, for instance.[81] Secondly, another differentiation has to be mentioned, this time it is one that was introduced by Freud himself – between neurosis and psychosis; it cannot but become dubious, however, if it is considered that while most of his patients suffered from – or at least were diagnosed with – hysterical neurosis, his most important theoretical insights (on temporality, on the work of phantasy etc.) were provided by people categorized as psychotics (e.g. Schreber, the Wolf man, the Rat man). Moreover, despite the fact that Freud was inclined to focus almost exclusively on cases of paranoia, and entirely neglected the term "schizophrenia" in his works and preferred to use "paraphrenia"[82] instead, the supposed formulation of schizophrenic structures received more attention in his legacy. That is why Freud has often been criticized for utilizing inadequate terminology; he refused to classify certain cases schizophrenic, even though the label itself came from his "household:" Eugen Bleuler, who originally introduced this terminus, was engaged in frequent correspondence with Freud, and even submitted to self-analysis with him. There is a hypothesis, however, put forward by Lacan, naturally, that Freud's decision of using "paraphrenia" instead of "schizophrenia" had been based on his will to position himself on the side of traditional, experimental and descriptive psychology, even if he could never inspect his patients' brains by means of the "talking cure," like Broca, Charcot or Flechsig had done with their microscopes and scalps.[83] With the help of idiosyncratic terminology, Freud took the "hard-science alternative" to the ways of interpretative psychology practiced by Bleuler.[84] Therefore, as Lacan puts it, Freud was out of synch with the age around him,[85] as usually: he was either way behind, not noticing that the term schizophrenia had quickly spread in analytic quarters,[86] or he already anticipated a kind of middle-ground which provided greater leeway for his speculative disposition.[87]

Now, back to Ferenczi, who, in contrast to Freud, tries to propose the relation between neurosis and psychosis in a more elastic manner. While he chiefly allocates introjection to neurosis and projection to paranoia,[88] he also leaves open the possibility of describing certain cases, most eminently Schreiber's, as paranoiac introjection building upon the phenomenon of constant self-addressing and compulsive self-reference. Ferenczi, nevertheless, makes serious efforts to define introjection as something close to incorporation and as the inverse of projection, even if he somehow realizes that the borders separating these two processes are more subtle than that. The terms he has chosen in his review on Mach's essay (i.e. introjection- and projection-machines) acquire their significance because – at roughly the same time – two more imaginary media[89] appeared in psychoanalysis both of which similarly exploited the processes of introjection and projection, but with respect to schizophrenia; it is the so-called "influencing machine" [Beeinflussungsapparat] of Victor Tausk,[90] and the spirit photography of Hyppolite Baraduc. Media approached on imaginary premises are usually addressed from the side of inscription technologies, since their materialization is inextricably linked to the event of imprinting.[91] Like Tausk's apparatus, they can also manifest as processes; realized via triggering change in the outer milieu (e.g. ordering objects), whose source lies at the heart of the inner's.[92] Therefore imaginary media are not passive subjects in the redistribution of elements and energies due to protocols, but occupy the position of creators and shapers of such. Yet the medium itself may not necessarily be tangible or even utterly "material," as in the case of Ferenczi's machines for meditating operations.[93] That is also the reason why such devices can become means of probing; they

are cut out for experimenting with materialities, for spatiotemporal orientation via interaction with existing objects, in the end enlightening the capabilities of mediated situations.[94] Because such apparatus cannot simply be categorized in a purely discursive manner but only as an assemblage of interactions connected to existing media technology in a particular era. Here, the term "assemblage" is understood in the Deleuzean way, as bodies, scenes and things making up complex constellations all of which take place in a temporal dimension opening up new operational possibilities.[95] Yet imaginary and dark media go beyond Deleuze's concept of machinic assemblages that generally materialize in environmental architecture, hermeneutics, and time-tables (i.e. economical praxis), by providing an interface where heterogeneous factors and their potential interactions for the subject do not lead to assimilation, but to a cluster of distinctive operations. Imaginary media this way always stem from the synthesis of inner cooperative elements, even though their function is precisely to disrupt such equilibriums – mediating in order to announce the breakdown of mediation. Consequently the practices of dark media can be included in imaginary media.

On the one hand, Ferenczi's machines of introjection can, thus, be compared to the "influencing machine." Tausk presents his apparatus as a mediating device in schizophrenia that haunts the subject because "it produces, as well as removes, thoughts and feelings by means of waves or rays or mysterious forces, which the patient's knowledge of physics is inadequate to explain."[96] Its components and blueprint remain a mystery, the only feature conceivable of it, is its operation including "thought broadcasting" (viz. projection) and "thought insertion" (viz. introjection).[97] It is partially realizable, nonetheless, only as far as it satisfies the need for causality of those suffering from paranoia.[98] And while it shares its features of spatial disposition and operation with Ferenczi's machines, the influencing machine triggers exactly the renouncing of interactions with objects,[99] and fuels intersubjective relations instead.[100] Therefore, Tausk's machine is closer to act as a telepathic device, rather than one which can manipulate time structures, against all claims stating that the apparatus is connected to regressive processes taking place in the psyche.[101] The influencing machine works more like an unpleasant amplifier: it makes the subject's thoughts heard in his outer milieu, while allows (supposed) offensive utterances to reach the schizophrenic's mind in return. A certain transference is undoubtedly involved in this case, yet it does not reside in the mediating act of the apparatus, as much as it does in the subject's act of identifying the thing made up by "boxes, cranks, levers, wheels, buttons, wires, batteries, and the like"[102] as the source, transmitting his or someone else's voice. This type of apparatus can be classified as weird media to the extent that its parts, which seemingly dispense with interconnections of any kind, are, nevertheless, capable of mediation. Just like Ferenczi's machines that are always manifested through material disruptions of the somatic dimension, the noisy breakdown executed by Tausk's influencing machine is possible because of its scrap parts – those elements which against all odds can work together. The latter's weirdness is provided by this very mechanical framework, as such random and incompatible parts ultimately execute a twisted mediation, ceaseless negative effects towards the paranoiac. Just like Ferenczi's introjection-machine, it can transfer something which is apparent but not (yet) present for its user,[103] but while for Ferenczi, weird media involve intermingling organs and tools to open up interactions between man and its environment, for which the accessibility of supernatural phenomena provide a model, in Tausk's case, the weirdness of mediation lies in the inexplicability of components analogous to psychic factors which are used to "grasp the completely new sensory realms that came about with new media technology."[104]

On the other hand, projection-machines can also be compared to another imaginary medium, namely spectral photography – an eminent example of Thacker's haunted media –, whose popularity persisted up until the end of the 19th century. Charcot's contemporary, Hyppolite Baraduc expressed his interest in the subject because he wanted to see the aura of his patients, or rather the process when the soul acquires its real form,[105] to be precise. He pursued those movements, which could not be perceived by the naked eye during seizures. His experiments, nevertheless, provided a model for temporal operations in analysis via employing a certain aggressive disposition, which later was partly covered by Ferenczi under active analysis,[106] a decade before Freud made his own contribution to the topic.[107] According to Ferenczi, the preparations associated with making projection-machines in analysis operate, are made up by the conflicts triggered, but for Baraduc it was setting the stage before inflicting effects that play their parts in getting

his desired seizure. In the latter's case, hysterical symptoms appeared on the photographic disc, whereas in the former's it was the ego itself that realized a machine; as a projection of a surface.[108] These recorded conflicts hold the potential endlessness of analysis, even if it is finished, hence the process of photography is taken for as deferred and exposed temporality, in the end providing the model for the symptom in analysis, whose temporal basis resists linearity. Hesitation and haste for coordinating the subject in front of the camera is paired up with afterwardsness [Nachträglichkeit] generated by materials such as ether and amyl-nitrite, both of which were utilized by Baraduc in order to temporally delay symptoms[109] like tremors, twitches and ticks, as well as by different ones, like nitrocellulose and mercury, which were widely used for the development of photographs. In this regard, repetition, as a form of materialist manifestation due to manipulating the hysteric via suggestion or telepathy, inherently contains the act of transmission. And while repetition as a symptom of repression also becomes recordable due to its "transmissional" origin, repression itself produces marks that are inaccessible to the analysand; these so-called "crypto-symbols" as meaningless factors[110] make introjection- and projection-machines break down unless the idea of mediating the uncommunicable (viz. dark media) is implemented in them. Therefore Ferenczi's machines, orienting patients by means of spatiotemporal manipulation through their materializing tendencies, have to operate on the merits of spiritist mediums and dark media, while they also introduce those things into the analytic situation, which could not be accessed any other way. Consequently, they can make the temporal frame in which psychoanalysis functions plausible and transmissible to the analysand, rather than just producing a simple discharge of satisfaction.

MACHINIC TEMPORALITY: EVOLUTION, ENTWICKLUNG, OR NEITHER?

It is certainly not a demanding task to provide a valid answer to the question, why Darwin's predecessor, Lamarck could function as common ground for Freud's and Ferenczi's historical views.[111] In fact, Ferenczi's statement about his ontogenetic theory having received a phylogenetic sister[112] is quite telling in this matter. When in 1915 Freud was even more eager than before to investigate the unique temporal horizon of repression, he was also moving closer and closer to identifying with Ferenczi's perspective, whose grounding hypothesis was that phylogenesis can be discovered in ontogenesis. Their aim was to substantiate the psychoanalytic method, and Lamarck's idea of development had several features which could be used as support for speculations. First of all, his theory of inheritance extended to environmental effects and to the usage of an organ (or the passivity of one, for that matter),[113] proved the interchangeable nature of individual and collective historical development for psychoanalysis. Secondly, his concept of neoteny as "the preservation in adults of shapes and growth rates that characterize juvenile stages of ancestral primates"[114] certainly falls in line with the psychoanalytic practice of tracing regression back to the infantile phase. Precisely because, unlike Mach's analogy drawn between infants and prehistoric men, it actually works on the level of species, supposing for instance that domesticated animals took after the cubs of wild ones. Thirdly, and in contrast to Darwin's conception of evolution, which first and foremost (but not exclusively) utilized adaptation via natural selection[115] – and through a so-called "struggle for life" which was later rephrased by Spencer as "the survival of the fittest" –, the Lamarckian way provided a larger space for speculating on the intersections of tribal and individual memory linked to development. Freud rejected Darwin's conception regarding the chain of being because the biologist conceived of it as a dynamism based on "lifeless causality."[116] All the more because memory, be it mental or biological, is not simply passed down from one generation to another, but from a theoretical perspective its very existence is an a priori condition for the whole Lamarckian system to function. And finally, as this also seems to shed some more light on Mach's blind-spot vis-á-vis Ferenczi:[117] regression, reversal, repetition, and subversion are all inherent to such a system, as Lamarck was the first to offer a temporalization of organic life by abandoning the fixity of species, and in return proposing the "mechanism of progressive modification."[118] The aforementioned Lamarckian theorems,[119] even though Lamarck himself still confined to teleology, and preserved the hierarchy of species with taking man for the model of perfection,[120] on the whole disrupted linear temporality.

Lamarck's conception of "use-inheritance," and the inheritance of acquired traits, however, required an ecology based on necessity, whose psychological counterpart was established upon genetic predisposition as adaptation.[121] His steady and dedicated materialist approach, nevertheless, allows for a hybrid praxis that handles organic processes according to the principles of mechanics. Whereas Darwin's idea of natural selection was postulated mainly as a strong opposition against the artificial selection practiced by animal breeders, professing that generations inherited the characteristics of the species' survivors,[122] Lamarck's materialism in his theory of evolution, via allowing a two-way correspondence (and communication) between genotype and phenotype, may show more affinity for machinic tendencies.[123] Therefore, even though Darwin's model suited the discoveries made during those fifty years between *Philosophie Zoologique* and *The Origin of the Species*,[124] Lamarck's chain of being for psychoanalysis ultimately holds the potential of non-linear, reversible, deferred temporality. Ferenczi had demonstrated this thesis in such a convincing way that not even Lacan, whose standpoint remained untouched by phylogenetic and bioanalytic influences, could avoid referring to his idea when confronted with Jones's own of the aphanisis (i.e. sublimation of desire).[125] In his wildly speculative[126] and probably most influential book entitled Thalassa, Ferenczi discussed repetition and regression on the merits of connecting ontogenesis to phylogenesis, so as to suppose an origin that deflects chronology and progression; the simultaneity of fertilization and anorganicity.[127] He supported this idea with his theory of the "amphimixis," a process of accumulation in libidinal energies,[128] nevertheless introducing a twist; accumulation happens on evolutionary soil, namely, in the swamp, a natural habitat to amphibians, eventually transforming amphimixis into amphioxus. Putting puns aside, Ferenczi conceived of the coitus of amphibians as a unifying act, both regressive and progressive, that simultaneously pointed to the origin of the species, as well as to its adaptation to various environments.[129] Ferenczi identified it as an exemplary process going both ways at the same time, and consequently transposed Freud's enigmatic "zeitlich-Entwicklungsgeschichte," based on the principle that the patient's past can be accessed due to his future, [130] onto a phylogenetic level.

Lacan, however, instead of following Ferenczi's lead on this one, turns to Norbert Wiener's thought experiment to explain Freud's historical perspective. It concerns two entities that live on opposing temporal planes. If one of them sends a message to the other, then while it is being inscribed, the other sees it disappear before it would have ever entirely manifested.[131] Lacan concludes that traces in psychoanalysis "continue not to be understood"[132] (viz. crypto-symbols) until their meanings are discovered. It is a standpoint immensely similar to Freud's Lamarckism. When repression is also situated as "after repression" [Nachdrängung], then Freud can legitimately exploit the Lamarckian thesis of interconnections between progression and regression; the development of a certain organ goes hand in hand with the devolution of another.[133]

Supplementing Freud's conception, Ferenczi proposes a moratorium that can serve as a temporal field of manifestation for a passing from the individual to the collective, pairing the dormancy of an organism with its fertilization (i.e. the stimulus triggering change).[134] This time-span might be the origin of how Freud imagined latency in his book on Moses, which originally utilizes the interval between taking a photo and developing it.[135] Ferenczi's conception of the caesura is, nevertheless, comes closer to spectral photography discussed above; it allows something otherwise inaccessible, that is the coincidence of two occurrences which are seemingly temporally apart. This difference in synchronicity is plausible only within a temporal framework established upon recurrence and reversals,[136] and that is the reason why it is clearly fueled by a Lamarckian perspective for Ferenczi as well. Applying a Lamarckian perspective, an event is self-identical only if it has either regressive or progressive consequences for the organism. Ferenczi's example concerns the tails of cats and dogs, an organ which once acted as support for body segments that no longer exist, and wherefore became an organ of expressing basic emotions, i.e. archaic gestures: "[i]t is in such lurking places, and in others of like kind, that the regressive tendency may be concealed at times of intensive adaptation, to come into play again as a formative factor when the worst of the danger has been surmounted."[137] But in cases like this, both regression and progression have to be in operation: "the return of the repressed is the effaced signal of something which only takes on its value in the future, through its symbolic realization, its integration into the history of the subject."[138] Simply put, temporal structures present in individual neurotic and psychotic cases grant access to those transformations in the outer milieu that are in fact no longer present (e.g. most eminently for Ferenczi, those of the ice age),[139] but whose effects nonetheless shaped collective inner milieus for the

species. It accumulates, on the one hand, something simultaneous, a synthesis of past and future, of memory and adaptation for the history of the subject and for the development of the species alike, as in the case of Ferenczi's amphibious unification act. On the other hand, this structure is only accessible on a non-atemporal basis, via a regressive movement as an act of restoration, one which cannot do without historical disposition. One can access the turns that determined the development of mankind on an individual level whenever the possibility of such regressive movement is granted by the temporality of repression. Ferenczi points out that Darwinian theory could never cater for the reoccurrence of traits supposedly extinct, that is "the return in the new product of evolution of earlier forms and modes of functioning,"[140] meaning that regression in a Darwinian context would be posed as sheer impossibility, whereas Lamarckian design acts as a fail-safe for less developed species to linger.[141] Ferenczi, however, directed criticism at Lamarck too, for the inverse reason he did towards Mach: for securing the eminent role of man and overlooking the potential pertinence of his theory for machinery, thus, dodging – not unlike Mach in this regard – the main question of "why it is that in the living organism the use of an organ does not result in its wearing out, as in the case of an inorganic thing such as a machine, but instead of this in its strengthening."[142] Because the answer to that, against all seemingly biological rhetoric,[143] might precisely point to an ecology that is based on non-organic properties contributing to the evolution and history of the subject.

Introjection —and projection— machines, once again as themselves being correlated with phases in development such that the former contributes to the subject's integration into the world of objects, while the latter provides automata that still offer interaction with the outer milieu of the subject, are, thus, for Ferenczi, ultimately means of coping with temporal processes beyond irreversible thermodynamics. The "Anthropos" plays its part in this matter only to the extent as it can be positioned as a variable in a formula that is shaped by the interaction between the inner and outer conditions in evolutionary history, providing a two-way temporal movement. This is the reason why Ferenczi has put forward catastrophes[144] as points of passage between the history of the individual and of the species, thus, also as occurrences of inscription. Catastrophes are events of recording, the inorganic forming of the living memory of matter, which are granted at the disposal of individuals whenever their psychic apparatus malfunctions (i.e. in neurotic and psychotic states). It is then that they can access the archive of ancient relations (viz. the Id) with the help of those organs that present them a history long forgotten. Machines do not make their contribution to Ferenczi's theory as models for how frequently used organs should deteriorate, but via the possibility that their components can deteriorate at all, and that the apparatus can be taken apart. Machines with their detachable parts can support (phylogenetic) recording and (ontogenetic) replaying; Ferenczi's machinic model enables the different organs of the body to be posed as a scene for hysteria and at the same time as a product of the evolution of the species. Putting it bluntly, machines can succeed in extracting catastrophes as events characterizing developments inscribed in the human first and foremost because they are implemented with the possibility of amputation.

The removal of prosthesis in psychoanalysis is identified as means of restoring the prehistoric state, which happens as a regression, just like in Freud's interesting passage in A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams, where he defines the sleep-state as a return to the primitive fetal phase via removing all extensions; fake teeth and wigs etc. included.[145] As has already been discussed concerning the materializing tendencies in producing somatic symptoms, Ferenczi radicalizes this idea by proposing that during sleep-phase when motility is all but fully limited, there can still occur a unique type of bodily discharge.[146] Because organisms tend to turn to different ways of realizing intensities via energetic accumulations, more often than not those based on the coupling of deference and reservation.[147] Ferenczi formulated this process organisms restrain to, as resting phases in active adaptation, unifying a fallback upon less developed conditions with progressing forward in life.[148] For partial paralysis to appear in sleep-state as an eminent somatic symptom, a kind of regression is also required, one which, from a topical angle, has to reach the deepest layers of the psychic apparatus. Because unconscious motility can only be triggered, if the instance itself coincides with the mechanical hypostasis of the unconscious.[149] In order for that to happen, the psychic apparatus would have to "leap back" to the prehistoric era of organisms. A bodily reconstruction of such a phase can only be possible with the act of auto-amputation inherent to Ferenczi's imaginary machines. Because if dark media as covered

by Thacker, announce the end of communication or the impossibility of mediation,[150] then Ferenczi's usage of introjection- and projection-machines for modeling temporal processes in a psychoanalytical way, mediate the removal of devices in order to reach a supposed original state of the organism. Machines are made use of so as to approach the state of synchronic unification, since they are at the same time appended to and removed from the human body. According to Ferenczi, this unification is the very act of waste-management; "the excretion of actual waste products (i.e., urine and fæces) with the elimination of the erotic tension accumulated in the genital and also with that of the age-old material of unpleasure [italics in the original – R. S.] which we think of as stored in the germ-plasm."[151] Nowadays, after inquiries into the materiality of media shifted their focus towards the resistance against total decomposability and inoperativity with "zombie media" that refuse to die when becoming obsolete,[152] with the handling of objects' remains in post-apocalyptic scenarios,[153] or with methods of digital waste-management,[154] Ferenczi's idea of linking organic and inorganic textures as being pursued upon Lamarckian premises can share some peculiar insights and contributions to the subject. Postulating his introjection- and projection-machines as imaginary media (re)ordering relations between inner and outer environments, between subject and world, extending the ego's field of operation, they cannot do without an ecology of their own. Based on this principle, Ferenczi once again criticizes the immensely theoretical and abstractly founded physicist perspective restrained by the second law of thermodynamics which in spite of accepting that in dead and inert matter some life still prevails, can only agree to disagree with Darwinian natural selection as far as it supposes a reassembling of energy. Psychoanalysis, however, sticking to the more animistic Lamarckian conception of evolution, supposes that a strict differentiation between life and death cannot at all be preserved, considering that "germs of life"[155] can still be excavated from inorganic matter – and in a parallel fashion, for machines, regression can be set in operation to access their components. The thing, which for Tausk seemed sheer impossibility, and consequently became the key element of weirdness in his apparatus, namely, how utterly incompatible parts could make the influencing machine work, in case of Ferenczi's imaginary media ceaselessly introjecting and projecting, show that it takes exactly scraps and salvaged components to make up such devices. Ferenczi's idea of machines stemming from disintegration[156] explains that imaginary media are not simply sites of cooperation but the act of disruption, and folding temporal domains into each other by means of the persistence and undying piling-up of materiality, ultimately constituting a framework outside of which no such entity can exist. In Ferenczi's ecology Lamarck's idea is put to use insofar as Leroi-Gourhan's conception of machinic assemblages plays a leading role for Guattari's; the abstract vitality of the organic matter is always ready to interfere with machines, or in other words, the constant exchange from the organic to the inorganic and back, is always secured in machinic environments. While according to Guattari, "[h]uman action remains adjacent to their gestation, waiting for the breakdown which will require its interventions: this residue of a direct act,"[157] Ferenczi portrays an ecology in which all stages passé are stored in the biological strata separated by the resistances of the subject.[158] He preserves the breakdowns of machinery, but not in a clear-cut manner as was exercised by Mach with postulating man as janitor to machines. For Ferenczi, regression in organic and inorganic structures materializes primarily in those organs or parts "which through development have become 'unemployed.'"[159] Machines in Ferenczi's theory, thus, in their materialized form, can either be tools (as connected to introjection) or automata (as connected to projection), but at the same time they are also the virtual work of defection and temporal manipulation. Hence, such imaginary media compose of twofold processes: they are never solely appropriated as those substance and/or form that mediatize practices, but as the folding and accumulation of space, time, and agency, namely as a cluster of interactions that resist mediation to be summed up or degraded to the binarism of beginnings and ends,[160] to inputs and outputs; these devices point to past and future continuously. This view is backed up by Lacan's witty use of words that expresses the psychoanalytic belief in looking for a patient's past in the dustbin,[161] while it is rather the regressive processes happening from the future towards the past – like the displacement of phantasy constructed in the future, projected back to the past as a substitute for an event – that can be identified by analysis working in its respective "deep time."[162] The idea discovered in Gould's thematization of the two extrema refined to the passage of time in civilization, namely time's arrow as "an irreversible sequence of unrepeatable events,"[163] and time's cycle composed of fundamental states "always present and never changing,"[164] is situated in a framework that caters for a material environment that takes

minerals, rocks, and elements, hence geometric factors to characterize its own temporal ground.[165] Gould, with these two distinct views identified in man's attitude to history, successfully opened a way for contemporary theoretical discourse on geological time, which skyrocketed only after Siegfried Zielinski reintroduced the idea of such deep time in media cultural studies. He took Blumenberg's insight into the history of technological media differing from history approached by man seriously. That resulted in a temporal disposition that executes the mediation of those objects which themselves mediate at all times.[166] Zielinski's concept of deep time utilized in his project of "anarchaeology" or "variantology" encapsulates the sum of some possible media-genealogies – in a Nietzschean and not in a Foucauldian sense. His geological approach aims at excavating deep strata to identify tectonic movements in the history of technology consisting of events, ideas, and drafts for innovations. Deep time is made up from certain segments of time, all bearing the plurality of forms and consequently enabling new constellations for the present. Folding layers into each other, new processes are set into motion, disrupting periodization and opening secret passages in history. This tesserae-like meshwork of a genealogy accumulates the handling of temporal planes along with human and geological history in a similar fashion as is pursued by De Landa with his idea of nonlinear history.[167] Ferenczi's machines likewise point back to their original disintegration, the rag-and-bone shop of mechanical parts, and also forward to the midden hide of their surviving components after they fall apart, – to apply some McLuhanian rhetoric.

Enacting the deep time of machinic ecology, they come into operation in the breakdowns of the psychic apparatus itself, which are considered to be psychosis and neurosis, and simultaneously disrupt linearity in history, thus, dismissing the simple idea of innovations always happening in the very same order, as was laid down by Mach. The more successful the mediation is proposed to be, the more the apparatus itself is blurred[168]– however, imaginary media are idiosyncratic in this sense, since their manifestation is dependable on breakdowns and inaccessibility, as in mental discordance and in supernatural communication. Ferenczi's machines, like all imaginary media, tend to function according to the hybrid Darwinian-Lamarckian rephrasal found once again in Gould:

> Although an organ may not have been originally formed for some special purpose, if it now serves for this end we are justified in saying that it is specially contrived for it. On the same principle, if a man were to make a machine for some special purpose, but were to use old wheels, springs, and pulleys, only slightly altered, the whole machine, with all its parts, might be said to be specially contrived for that purpose. Thus throughout nature almost every part of each living being has probably served, in a slightly modified condition, for diverse purposes, and has acted in the living machinery of many ancient and distinct specific forms.[169]

The archeology of their effects can be carried out nevertheless, which is actually the mapping of conditions for manifestation, the interaction of virtual operations with and through their material basis. Ferenczi's introjection- and projection-machines in this manner execute a leap back to the era of primitive tools, or of no tools at all, for that matter, and are at the same time unified with and differentiated from the era where devices are disjointed from man, but still make up his environment.[170]

The subject's integration into the Symbolic, or his interaction with objects is of a temporally atemporal nature; introjection- and projection-machines, when removed, mediate beyond the timeless Symbolic, and reveal the historical basis with their obsolescence. Consequently, this ecology on the one hand is constructed by the successful functioning of machinery in events of breakdowns that in turn, and on Lamarckian premises, provide the history of regressive traits for the species, and the regressive processes in neurotic and psychotic states for the individual. While, on the other hand, machinery functioning in malfunctioning – as was often the case with spectral photography[171] – grants the job of maintenance to man, just like Mach insisted. Ferenczi's machinic framework is, nevertheless, dominated by a different regime of entropy than the one present in thermodynamics, which also provides Mach's linear history. Because psychoanalysis is precisely an investigation that requires going beyond autopoiesis, and not a return to it[172] when faced with the regression to a primal state through machinic decomposition: it does not dispose of a linear feedback

loop, but makes use of disequilibrium. Disrupting homeostasis with the accumulation of simultaneous feedbacks and feedforwards, psychoanalytic inquiries of this kind also draw a so-called "proto-subjective diagram,"[173] which serves as the blueprint for the operations of the psychic apparatus.

What Ferenczi criticizes in Mach's scheme for the history of mechanics, namely that it can only be postulated as abstraction, he himself puts forward in a structure that later becomes the ground for Gilbert Simondon: "he speaks in terms of the essence of technical objects at the same time that he speaks of a modern historical transformation that brought the technical individual to the fore."[174] The history of machinery as laid down by Ferenczi's apparatus, connected to human subjects, reveals the potentiality of disruptions, of the psychic apparatus's breakdowns, via introjection- and projection-machines functioning in malfunctioning; reconstructing states in the history of the species through the history of devices. The field of operation for the ego can then be proposed as a field of interactions between man and machine, via which the accessibility of the inaccessible can be executed due to the material basis that is manifested in non-sense crypto-symbols, persisting in deep time, refusing to die, and operating from the strata of stored inoperative traits and salvaged parts, reactivated whenever regression takes place with regard to the aim of such persistence – to establish connection with the eternal great beyond and with mythical prehistory at one and the same time.

To conclude, Ferenczi's introjection- and projection-machines, despite being allocated to phases of individual development, substantiate a history of machines that is characterized by breakdowns, removals and failures when operating successfully. In this fashion, not only do they integrate and orient the subject in his outer milieu, but produce regressions to access processes that shaped the development of the species, thereupon connecting the individual to catastrophes as events of inscription on the organs of the body. This prosthesis, however, do not simply mediate something uncommunicable like dark media, but via the possibility of being removed, they restore a supposed original fetal state for neurotics and psychotics in an environment that is in the end constructed by them. Carrying out an act of unification, folding together befores and afters, Ferenczi's machinery is a means of accessing the "proto-psychical."[175] It all comes down to Ferenczi's theorem of unification linked to the handling of waste-products and to the processes of discharge, disrupting both the atemporal symbolic world of objects, and the presumed linearity of history, on the basis of obsolescence and disjunction: by Lamarck's view of defective traits and desolated organs, Ferenczi's model for describing the relations between the ego and its outer milieu via tools is ultimately transformed into an ecology suitable for human-machine interactions. And in that, the analyst acts not as a janitor but as an engineer, calibrating components in the patient's projection and introjection-machines to achieve the machinic hypostasis of unconscious temporal processes.

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Notas al final

1.- This paper is part of the MTA-ELTE Association of General Studies of Literature Research Group's project Culture-Producing Media, Practices and Techniques (TKI01241).

2.- 1021F, 1115F. In order to refer to the correspondence between Freud and Ferenczi, I apply the customary means throughout this essay; using ordinal numbers followed by abbreviations F if the letter is sent by Freud or Fer if the addresser is Ferenczi. This way, readers can refer to either the German (Sigmund Freud/Sándor Ferenczi, Briefwechsel, [eds. Eva Brabant/Ernst Falzeder], Wien 1993–2005, vol. 1–3.) or to the English edition (The Correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sándor Ferenczi [eds. Eva Brabant/Ernst Falzeder/ Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch], Cambridge [MA] 1993–2000, vol. 1–3.) of the correspondence.

3.- Ferenczi's project, which was encouraged by Freud (See 557F), is presented in detail: 572Fer.

4.- 90F.

5.- Pál Harmat, Freud, Ferenczi és a magyarországi pszichoanalízis [Freud, Ferenczi, and the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Movement], Budapest 1994, p. 96.

6.-137Fer.

7.- See 203Fer, 390Fer

8.-While Freud's connection to archaeology has already been exquisitely discussed at length in Knut Ebeling's Wilde Archäologien (Berlin 2012, pp. 254–361), despite its evident symptoms, one cannot find a single essay which thematizes Ferenczi's fascination with the subject.

9.- Ernst Mach, Kultur und Mechanik, Stuttgart 1915, p. 5. The copy I am working with is Ferenczi's own, containing his notes to certain passages

10.- Sándor Ferenczi, Zur Psychogenese der Mechanik, in: id., Schriften zur Psychoanalyse, Frankfurt a. M. 1970, vol. 1, pp. 288–296, here p. 289.

11.- Cf. Althusser's idea of differentiating and connecting partial and general theory: Louis Althusser, Three Notes on the Theory of Discourses, in: id., The Humanist Controversy and Other Writings (1966–67), London 2003, pp. 33–84, here p. 63

12.- See Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Historische Epistemologie zur Einführung, Hamburg 2007, pp. 99f

13.- Ferenczi, Zur Psychogenese der Mechanik, p. 289.

14.- Ibid., p. 290.

15.- Sigmund Freud, Das Ich und das Es, Wien 1923, p. 43

16.- Ibid., p. 40

17.- Mach, Kultur und Mechanik, pp. 46f.

18.- Mach's attitude, however, is far from being unique in the 20th century; when tracing the birth of technology, Gille implemented a similar interaction between man and machine. See Bertrand Gille, Les mécaniciens grecs: La naissance de la technologie, Paris 1980, p. 214

19.- Mach, Kultur und Mechanik, pp. 48–53.

20.- Ferenczi, Zur Psychogenese der Mechanik, p. 292.

21.- See Paul Dukes, Minutes to Midnight: History and the Anthropocene, London 2011, pp. 50f.

22.- Sigmund Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology, in: id., The Origins of Psychoanalysis. Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, Drafts and Notes 1887–1902, New York [NY] 1950, S. 347–451, here p. 358.

23.- Bernard Stiegler's term, to whose approach Ferenczi's point of view is actually quite similar. They both regard technology as neither a positive nor a negative attribute of the human, but as its default and de-faulting origin. Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time vol. 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, Stanford [CA] 1998, p. 235, and id., Technics and Time vol. 2: Disorientation, Stanford [CA] 2009, p. 18. The basic idea of technogenesis running parallel to anthropogenesis is, however, also valid for Mach, of course.

24.- Mach, Kultur und Mechanik, p. 28

25.- See 551F

26.- Cf. Sándor Ferenczi, Entwicklungsstufen des Wirklichkeitssinnes, in: id., Schriften zur Psychoanalyse, pp. 148–163, here pp. 162f.

27.- Ibid., p. 158

28.- Id, Zur Psychogenese der Mechanik, p. 292.

29.- Cf. Mach, Kultur und Mechanik, p. 48

30.- Cf. Ibid., p. 53.

31.- Ibid., p. 16.

32.- Ibid.

33.- Cf. Sándor Ferenczi, Introjektion und Übertragung, Wien 1910, pp. 12f.

34.- Id., Zur Psychogenese der Mechanik, p. 293

35.- See Mach, Kultur und Mechanik, pp. 20 and 61

36.- Ferenczi, Zur Psychogenese der Mechanik, p. 293

37.- See Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan vol. 2: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis (1954-1955), New York [NY] 1988, p. 194

38.- Mach, Kultur und Mechanik, pp. 17f.

39.- Ferenczi, Zur Psychogenese der Mechanik, p. 294

40.- Mach, Kultur und Mechanik, p. 61. [my translation – R. S.]

41.- Ferenczi, Zur Psychogenese der Mechanik, p. 295

42.- In this regard – as will be discussed in the third part of this essay – the state of sleep gains its exemplary importance. See esp. 155Fer.

43.- See Freud's compliments to Ferenczi for establishing the conditions of repetition in a bioanalytic context in 559F.

44.- Ferenczi paraphrasing Mach: Ferenczi, Zur Psychogenese der Mechanik, p. 296.

45.- Ibid.

46.- Bitsch's term; cf. Annette Bitsch, Diskrete Gespenster: Die Genealogie des Unbewußten aus der Medientheorie und Philosophie der Zeit, Bielefeld 2009, p. 151

47.- For a short summary, see Roger Luckhurst, The Invention of Telepathy, Oxford 2002, pp. 270–273. For a more detailed overview: Júlia Gyimesi, Sándor Ferenczi and the Problem of Telepathy, n: History of the Human Sciences, 25 (2012) 3, pp. 131–148

48.- See 555F.

49.- Cf. Jacques Derrida, My Chances / Mes chances, in: id., Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Stanford 2007, vol. 1, pp. 366f. Another example is Ferenczi's explanation for Freud's typo when writing 1809 instead of 1909 on page 181 in the second edition of his The Interpretation of Dreams. Ferenczi allocates the mistake to the imperative form used by Freud in the sentence ("see") and to the impossibility to carry out the comparison Freud desires. Namely, Freud employs antedating, referring to an essay which was not yet published in 1908, but writing the series of numerals 1909 still felt unusual to him. 26Fer

50.- See Júlia Gyimesi, Pszichoanalízis és spiritizmus [Psychoanalysis and Spiritism], Budapest 2011, p. 79.

51.- Sigmund Freud, Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens, Wien 1923, p. 309.

52.- Gyimesi, Pszichoanalízis és spiritizmus, p. 80

53.- See 169Fer and 171F. It all started with Ferenczi's distress over cooperating with Freud on the Schreber-project. Freud planned to write the psychoanalytic interpretation of the late judge's emoire with Ferenczi being assigned the role of a simple scrivener in the process. Their relationship got ven more uneasy, when Ferenczi accused Freud of carrying out an analysis on his letters, similar to the ne executed on Schreber's text.

54.- Harmat, Freud, Ferenczi és a magyarországi pszichoanalízis, pp. 89f; André Haynal, Ferenczi and the Origins of Psychoanalytic Technique, in: Lewis Aron/Adrienne Harris (eds.), The Legacy of Sándor Ferenczi, London 1993, pp. 53–74, here p. 55.

55.- See Ibid., p. 58

56.- Lou Andreas-Salomé, The Freud Journal of Lou Andreas-Salomé, New York [NY] 1964, p. 105.

57.- Sándor Ferenczi, A tudás mérlege [A Report on Knowledge], in: id., A pszichoanalízis felé: Fiatalkori írások 1897–1908 [Towards Psychoanalysis: The Writings of the Young Ferenczi 1987–1908], Budapest 1999, pp. 190–193, here p. 190

58.- Id., Spiritizmus [Spiritism], in: ibid., pp. 27–30, here p. 27.

59.- Cf. Élisabeth Roudinesco, Why Psychoanalysis?, New York [NY] 2002, pp. 106f.. Roudinesco argues that despite its occultist connotations, psychoanalysis should be understood less as being integrated into the millennium-old tradition of spiritism, but rather on the merits of psychoanalysis, in its essence, posed as an alternative form of knowledge opposing "official" investigations on perception

60.- See Varadaraja V. Raman, Vielfalt in der Mystik und Parallelen zur Naturwissenschaft, in: Christoph F. E. Holzhey (ed.), Biomystik: Natur, Gehirn, Geist, München 2007, pp. 61–80, here p. 71

61.- Ferenczi especially likes to draw an analogy between hypnosis and suggestion applied in analysis as they both aim at „[i]nfluencing someone by activating transference phenomena in someone." [my translation – R. S.] 271Fer

62.- Sigmund Freud, Psychoanalyse und Telepathie, in: id., Gesammelte Werke Bd. XVII, London 1955, pp. 28–30.

63.- Cf. Id., Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, Wien 1931, p. 50.

64.- See 1031F, 1124F, and 1145F.

65.- See Friedrich A. Kittler, Eine Kulturgeschichte der Kulturwissenschaft, München 2000, p. 213

66.- Annette Bitsch, Die Kybernetik des Unbewußten, das Unbewußte der Kybernetik, in: Claus Pias (ed.). Cybernetics – Kybernetik: Die Macy-Konferenzen 1946-1953 vol. 2: Dokumente und Reflexionen, Zürich 2004, pp. 153–168, here p. 156.

67.-67 See Lydia H. Liu, The Freudian Robot: Digital Media and the Future of the Unconscious, Chicago [IL] 2010, pp. 2f.

68.- See Eugene Thacker, Dark Media, in: Alexander Galloway/Eugene Thacker/McKenzie Wark (eds.), Excommunications: Three Inquiries in Media and Mediation, Chicago [IL] 2014, pp. 77–149, here p. 93

69.- Ibid., p. 129

70.- Ibid., p. 131

71 - Ibid., pp. 134f.

72.- At a quite early stage in their correspondence, when Ferenczi enthusiastically told Freud about his experiments with telepathy, the latter reacted that „even if Mrs. Siedler could reproduce your thoughts, she would not comprehend their visual manifestations in her mind." 75F. [my translation – R. S.]

73.- Sándor Ferenczi, Das klinische Tagebuch, Frankfurt/M 2013, p. 103. [my translation – R. S.]

74.- See Freud, Zur Einführung des Narzißmus, Wien 1924, pp. 6f.

75.- See Sándor Ferenczi, Entwicklungsstufen des Wirklichkeitssinnes, in: id., Schriften zur Psychoanalyse, pp. 155ff.

76.- Cf. Stefan Andriopoulos, Okkulte und Technische Television in: Stefan Andriopoulos/Bernhard J. Dotzler (eds.), 1929: Beiträge zur Archäologie der Medien, Frankfurt/M 2002, pp. 31–53, here p. 41.

77.- Due to Ferenczi's work and despite Jones's attempt to limit this fascination in the International Psychoanalytical Association, the possibility of occult transmissions between analysts and patients became a serious issue. See Luckhurst, The Invention of Telepathy, p. 275

78.- Ferenczi, Introjektion und Übertragung, p. 11.

79.- Id., Hysterie und Pathoneurosen, Wien 1919, p. 23. [my translation – R. S.]

80.- John Durham Peters, Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication, Chicago [IL] 2000, p. 142.

81.- Mai Wegener, Neuronen und Neurosen: Der psychische Apparat bei Freud und Lacan, München 2004, p. 22.

82.- The term originates from the concept of "hebephrenia" as described by Hecker and Kahlbaum; its symptoms included mood-swings, bizarre and infantile behavior, along with mental regression (cf. Abdullah Kraam/Paula Phillips, Hebephrenia: A Conceptual History, in: History of Psychiatry 23 (2012) 4, pp. 387–403, here pp. 389f.) Later, Emil Kraepelin, however, classified hebephrenia as a subtype of dementia praecox (Ibid., p. 399.), and separated those cases which did not include the mentioned mental regression at all, but still caused distortion in the patient's personality. Consequently, he positioned this new, mixed set of symptoms between paranoia and schizophrenia, labelling it paraphrenia in the end. See Ian Dowbiggin, Delusional Diagnosis? The History of Paranoia as a Disease Concept in the Modern Era, in: History of Psychiatry 11 (2000) 1, pp. 37–69, here p. 45.

83.- See Friedrich Kittler, Flechsig/Schreber/Freud: Ein Nachrichtennetzwerk der Jahrhundertwende, in: id., Die Wahrheit der technischen Welt: Essays zur Genealogie der Gegenwart, Frankfurt/M 2013, pp. 76–90, here pp.78–80.

84.- Dowbiggin, Delusional Diagnosis?, p. 48

85.- Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan vol. 3: The Psychoses 1955–1956, New York [NY] 1997, p. 4.

86.- Even Ferenczi tried to draw Freud's attention to the mistake in the second edition of his Schreber-essay by pointing out that Freud inconsistently used the terms paraphrenia and dementia praecox interchangeably, supposing that one took Kraepelin's differentiation seriously: 425Fer.

87.- Viz. Freud's construction of an analogy between a paraphreniac's hipochondric traits and the anxiety of a neurotic; where anxiety is supposed to emerge, there the libido's partial detachment from objects can be found, which is motivated to reestablish cathexis due to reconstructive (or regressive) urge (cf. Sigmund Freud, Zur Einführung des Narzißmus, pp. 6f.), eventually resulting in repetition

88.- Ferenczi, Introjektion und Übertragung, p. 10. Also see 218Fer

89.- Although the term was first put forward by Siegfried Zielinski, I use this concept as was elaborated on by Jussi Parikka. He defines imaginary media with the help of Deleuze's and Guattari's machinic theory as media that are materially manifested with the help of discursive practices (Jussi Parikka, What is Media Archaeology?, London 2012, p. 44.).

90.- While Tausk uses the word "apparatus" instead of "machine," he might have got the overall idea to write about this topic from Ferenczi. It is all the more possible because Freud made it quite explicit that the main reason he refused to accept Tausk as an analysand, he was afraid of being robbed of his ideas by him. See 499Fer.

91.- Cf. Parikka, What is Media Archaeology?, p.47

92.- See id., Media Ecologies and Imaginary Media: Transversal Expansions, Contractions, and Foldings, in: Fiber Culture 17 (2011) 3, pp. 34–50, here p. 36

93.-See ibid., p. 45.; Id., What is Media Archaeology?, p. 54.; Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, Indianapolis [IN] 1995, p. 35.

94.- See Parikka, Media Ecologies and Imaginary Media, p. 43.

95.- Cf. Alan Parr, The Deleuze Dictonary. Edinburgh 2010, p. 18

96.- Victor Tausk, On the Origin of the "Influencing Machine" in Schizophrenia, in: Journal of Psychotherapy Practice and Research 2 (1992) 1, pp. 185–206, here p. 186.

97.- See Jeffrey Sconce, On the Origins of the Origins of the Influencing Machine, in Erkki Huhtamo/Jussi Parikka (eds.), Media Archaeology: Approaches, Applications, and Implications, Berkeley [CA] 2011, pp. 70–94, here p. 71.

98.- Tausk, On the Origin of the "Influencing Machine", pp. 187 and 190.

99.- Ibid., p. 201

100.- See Sconce, On the Origins of the Origins of the Influencing Machine, p. 82

101.- Tausk, On the Origin of the "Influencing Machine", pp. 195 and 199

102.- Ibid., p. 186.

103.- Cf. Thacker, Dark Media, p. 133

104.- Parikka, What is Media Archaeology?, p. 50.

105.- Georges Didi-Huberman, Invention of Hysteria: Charcot and the Photographic Iconography of the Salpêtrière, Cambridge [MA] 2003, p. 92

106.- Ferenczi originates the methodology of inducing conflicts in patients, and consequently scansioning analysis (i.e. hastening or slowing the progression of sessions) from his genital theory. See 51Fer. Yet, in contrast to Freud, he dismissed the thesis that acting out [Agieren] could ever be adequately substituted for the act of remembering, and he adhered to the key role of verbally reconstructing memories even in active analysis. Cf. 1009Fer.

107.- See. Sigmund Freud, Die endliche und die unendliche Analyse, in: Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse 23 (1937) 2, pp. 209–240, here p. 223

108.- See Freud, Das Ich und das Es, pp. 24f

109.- Didi-Huberman, Invention of Hysteria, p. 215

110.- 344Fer

111.- After ordering Lamarck's books, Ferenczi writes to Freud that „I am predicting all kinds of things there and am actually already convinced about it." 634Fer. Freud then replies that „each of us reads, if possible, everything that is noteworthy […]. We should support each other from the beginning with hints as to where things can be found." 638F

112.- 556Fer.

113.- Cf. Stephen Jay Gould, Senseless Signs of History, in: id., The Panda's Thumb: More Reflections in Natural History, New York [NY] 1980, pp. 27–34, here p. 29.

114.- Id., Our Allotted Lifetimes, in: ibid., pp. 299–305, here p. 301.

115.- Id, The Panda's Thumb, in: ibid., pp. 19–26, here p. 21–23

116.- Harry Gershenowitz, The Influence of Lamarckism on the Development of Freud's Psychoanalytic Theory, in: Indian Journal of the History of Science 14 (1978) 2, pp. 105–113, here p. 106.

117.- It is worth noting that while Ferenczi's review of Mach's book was not published until 1918, he had already been working on it since 1915. This is the same year when, together with Freud, he picked up the idea of employing the Lamarckian theory of development in psychoanalysis. On top of that, Ferenczi did not consider his work on Mach's conception of the history of mechanics as abandoning the project of bioanalysis, but rather as a part of it. See 577Fer

118.- Friedel Weinert, Copernicus, Darwin, & Freud: Revolutions in the History and Philosophy of Science, Oxford 2009, p. 104.

119.- For a different taxonomy, see Gershenowitz, The Influence of Lamarckism …, p. 107

120.- Weinert, Copernicus, Darwin, & Freud, p. 105

121.- Gershenowitz, The Influence of Lamarckism…, pp. 106 and 108

122.- David Christian, Maps of Time: Introduction to Big History, Los Angeles [CA] 2011, p. 88.

123.- George Dyson, Darwin among the Machines: The Evolution of Global Intelligence, New York [NY] 1997, p. 31.

124.- See Weinert, Copernicus, Darwin, & Freud, pp. 105–112

125.- Jacques Lacan, On the Subject Who is Finally in Question, in: id., Écrits, New York [NY] 2006, pp. 189–196, here p. 192

126.- Ferenczi admits that the book and his genital theory on the whole, are products of his years in the army, serving as a medical officer during World War I. At that time he totally surrendered to speculative thinking. Cf. 1196Fer. Back in those years, Ferenczi compared himself to speculative biologists, „who, always moving far from reality – would like to build the entire world edifice on the few facts that are known to them." 535Fer.

127.- Sándor Ferenczi, Thalassa: A Theory of Genitaly, New York [NY] 1986, p. 63.

128.- Lacan, On the Subject Who is Finally in Question, p. 192.

129.- Ferenczi, Thalassa, pp. 63f.

130.- Ferenczi, Thalassa, pp. 63f.

131.- Ibid., S. 159.

132.- Ibid.

133.- Sigmund Freud, Jenseits des Lustprinzips, Wien 1923, p. 57

134.- Ferenczi, Thalassa, p. 63.

135.- Freud, Moses, pp. 120f.

136.- For example, Ferenczi executed a peculiar subversion in the tropological relationship between sea and womb. Whereas the former is usually taken for representing the latter, according to Ferenczi, it is the womb which has to be comprehended as a symbol for the sea due to the organism's urge to return to its prehistoric habitat. Ferenczi, Thalassa, p. 76.

137.- Ibid., p. 92.

138.- Lacan, Freud's Papers on Technique, p. 159.

139.- See 971Fer.

140.- 140 Ferenczi, Thalassa, p. 51.

141.- Weinert, Copernicus, Darwin, & Freud, p. 105

142.- Ferenczi, Thalassa, p. 91.

143.- Lacan, Freud's Papers on Technique, p. 22

144.- It is worth noting that unlike all editions published outside Hungary, the original Hungarian version of Ferenczi's Thalassa is entitled "Catastrophes in Genital Activity" [Katasztrófák a nemi működésben].

145.- Id., A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams, id., Standard Edition vol. 14: On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on Metapsychology and Other Works, London 1975, pp. 222–235, here p. 222. Also see 552Fer

146.- Ferenczi, Hysterie und Pathoneurosen, p. 24.

147.- Dominic Pettman, Human Error: Species-Being and Media Machines, Minneapolis [MN] 2011, p. 185

148.- Ferenczi, Thalassa, p. 92.

149.- Id., Hysterie und Pathoneurosen, p. 24.

150.- Thacker, Dark Media, p. 133.

151.- Ferenczi, Thalassa, p. 64.

152.- See Jussi Parikka/Garnet Hertz, Zombie Media: Circuit Bending Media Archaeology into an Art Method, Leonardo 45 (2012) 5, pp. 424–430

153.- See esp. the part on McCarthy in Eva Horn, Zukunft als Katastrophe, Frankfurt/M 2014, pp. 181–240.

154.- Jennifer Gabrys, Digital Rubbish: A Natural History of Electronics, Michigan [MI] 2013.

155.- Ferenczi, Thalassa, p. 94.

156.- Ibid.

157.- Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 36.

158.- Ferenczi, Thalassa, p. 91., for a "deep time" take on the subject, see Manuel De Landa, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History, New York [NY] 2000, p. 137.

159.- Ferenczi, Thalassa, p. 92.

160.- Cf. ibid., p. 93.

161.- Lacan, Freud's Papers on Technique, p. 157.

162.- Cf. Sigfried Zielinski, Deep Time of the Media. Toward an Archeology of Hearing and Seeing by Technical Means, Cambridge [MA] 2006, pp. 3–5

163.- Stephen Jay Gould, Time's Arrow – Time's Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of Geological Time, Cambridge [MA] 1996, p. 10

164.- Ibid., p. 11

165.- Ibid., pp. 196f.

166.- Cf. Hans Blumenberg, Geistesgeschichte der Technik, Frankfurt/M 2009, pp. 52–55.

167.- See De Landa, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History, pp. 59f.

168.- See Parikka, What is Media-Archaeology?. pp. 61f.; Bruno Latour, Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies. Cambridge [MA] 2000, pp. 183–185

169.- Gould, The Panda's Thumb, p. 26.

170.- Even in the immensely material way of obsolete media becoming part of the Earth's ecosystem. See Jussi Parikka,The Anthrobscene, Minneapolis [MN] 2014, loc. 449, 597. [Kindle ebook]

171.- See Friedrich Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, Stanford [CA] 1999, pp. 10f.

172.- Distinguishing between autoplastic and alloplastic adaptations, Ferenczi links the former to the operation of the psychic apparatus carrying out sleep-state materialization of tendencies which are considered the organism's immediate reaction to stimuli (Ferenczi, Hysterie und Pathoneurosen, p. 24.).

173.- Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 37.

174.- Thomas Lamarre, Humans and Machines, in: Inflexions 5 (2012), pp. 29–67, here p. 44

175.- Ferenczi, Hysterie und Pathoneurosen, p. 24