"UTERUS LOQUITUR": TRAUMA AND THE HUMAN ORGANISM IN FERENCZI'S "PHYSIOLOGY OF PLEASURE" (*).

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SUMMARY. The paper reconstructs Ferenczi's unique and largely neglected *physiology of pleasure*. It highlights the prominent place of the libido in Ferenczi's writings, the transition from the *physiology* of use to the *physiology of pleasure* and the role of trauma in Ferenczi's work with a special emphasis on the beauty and plasticity of the body, the relations between its organs as well as the adaptive potential, the *Orphic powers*, and the natural vigor of the human organism. Ferenczi's theoretical assumptions and his powerful images of the human organism are examined in the light of Goethe's, Schopenhauer's, and Nietzsche's philosophies.

KEY WORDS: libido; physiology of pleasure; trauma; adaptive potential; Orphic powers; Ferenczi

RESUMEN. El artículo reconstruye la singular y en gran parte desatendida *fisiología del placer* de Ferenczi. Destaca el prominente lugar de la libido en los escritos de Ferenczi, la transición de la *fisiología* de la función a la *fisiología del placer* y el papel del trauma en el trabajo de Ferenczi con un especial énfasis en la belleza y plasticidad del cuerpo, las relaciones entre sus órganos. así como el potencial adaptativo, los *poderes Órficos* y el natural vigor del organismo humano. Los supuestos teóricos de Ferenczi y sus poderosas imágenes del organismo humano se examinan a la luz de las filosofías de Goethe, Schopenhauer y Nietzsche.

PALABRAS CLAVE: libido; fisiología del placer; trauma; potencial adaptativo; poderes Órficos; Ferenczi.

INTRODUCTION

In 1929 in a letter to Freud (December 25), Sándor Ferenczi -"l'enfant terrible, rebel, and group outsider" (Poster, 2009, p. 202)- criticized psychoanalysis for focusing "too one-sidedly" on ego psychology and for "neglecting the organic-hysterical basis of the analysis" (cited in Ferenczi, 1932, p. xii). In *Thalassa: A Theory of Genitality* (1924), in another critical stance, he opposed the "physiology and pathology of use" ("Nutzphysiologie" and "Nutzpathologie") (Ferenczi, 1924a, p. 83), which thoroughly ignored the libidinal energy of the body organs. Ferenczi became a pioneer of a new physiology -the *physiology of pleasure*. From early on his writings demonstrate his preoccupation with the functions and expressions of the body organs and with the correspondences and interactions between them. Ferenczi (1932) was convinced that no organ remains "undiscovered by the psyche" (p. 174). He adopted Freud's distinction between alloplastic and autoplastic control, emphasized the plasticity of the body, and developed a singular view of the structure and the functions of the human organism.

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct Ferenczi's "physiology of pleasure", determine the place of trauma in it, show how trauma relates to pleasure, and identify the effects of Ferenczi's shift from internal to external trauma on his "physiology of pleasure". Traumatic processes and the response of the organism to them are codified by Ferenczi as a unique mixture of Dionysian and Orphic elements, which focus on the vigor and the adaptive potential of the organism -ideas that can be traced back to Goethe, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and others. The influence of these and other forerunners on Ferenczi's "physiology of pleasure" and on his conception of trauma has been neglected. It is impossible to assess the full range of Ferenczi's theory and therapeutic work without appraising these influences, which could be seen as part of what Mészáros (1993) calls Ferenczi's "intellectual restlessness" and "intellectual flexibility" (p. 49).

PLEASURE AND LIBIDO

In “On Narcissism: An Introduction”, Freud honored Ferenczi’s focus on the libidinal impulses and his analysis of “the influence of organic disease upon the distribution of libido”. But while Freud (1914) had shown that the libido -“however strong”- could be “banished by bodily ailments” (pp. 148–149) and put the emphasis on the connection between libido and suffering and on that between the libido and the ego, Ferenczi developed a very different approach in the years between 1908 and 1919, which Balint (1970) defined as Ferenczi’s “classical period” (p. IX).

An exploration of Ferenczi’s concept of trauma has to begin with the exploration of his notions of pleasure and libido. Following Kramer (1997, p. 222), Mészáros (2010) states that Freud had “no genuine theory of emotional life, only a highly abstract and intellectualized theory of libido” (p. 332). Early in his psychoanalytic career, Ferenczi started developing his own libido theory, so when he launched his trauma theory, this was not “a return” to the early Freud but a consequent continuation of his own insights “on the basis of clinical observations” (Dupont, 1998, p. 236) and under the strong intellectual influence of several previous thinkers other than Freud. Like Freud, Ferenczi (1908) adopted Fechner’s principle of constancy, but put much more emphasis on pleasure than Freud by pointing to the “natural tendency to experience the greatest possible gratification at the price of the least possible strain” (p. 281), thus showing that it is possible to extract pleasure at any level of tension. Similarly to Freud, Ferenczi (1909) criticized the repression of the libido imposed by society but while Freud defined neurosis by focusing only on conflict, Ferenczi viewed neurosis from the perspective of pleasure -as a “flight from the pleasure that has become disagreeable” (p. 45)- and set out to restore and rehabilitate pleasure. Besides, from the very beginning Ferenczi’s emphasis on pleasure is relational and interpersonal (see Rudnytsky, 2002; Poster, 2009; Lothane, 2010) because he described neurosis as a retreat of the libido from objects “that were formerly charged with pleasantness” (Ferenczi, 1909, p. 45).

Ferenczi did not limit the activity of the libido to the psyche. Beginning with Freud’s conversion model, he turned his attention to the displacement of the libido from the psyche to the body and vice versa, as well as from the individual organism to the external reality. An impressive metaphor exemplifies the power of the libido: it “seeks satisfaction from external objects” (ibid., p. 46). What may look like the demonization of a powerful, insatiable libido is the demonstration of its natural, primal vigor. Closely related to this vision of the libido is Ferenczi’s concept of introjection in which the “free-floating, unsatisfied, and unsatisfiable” libido is a force of high density and intense energy, which breaks loose from its confinement within the narrow boundaries of the individual organism to “help” itself and to satisfy its needs on the objects of the external reality in a “kind of diluting process” (ibid., p. 47). Freud (1905) also talked of the adhesiveness of the libido (p. 144), yet in his conception the libido is less impulsive and powerful but sticky, inert, and of higher viscosity. In Ferenczi’s theory, the libido is much more fluid and capable of escaping from suffering -an autonomous repair mechanism achieved by expansion. Thus, the displeasure is being “expelled” (Ferenczi, 1909, p. 47), the tension is being lowered via procedures such as the “widening” or the “shrinking” of the ego (p. 48), and the equilibrium is being restored.

Ferenczi’s principle of “primordial projection” (“Urprojektion”) also emphasizes the natural link between the individual organism and the external reality and the “monistic” unity of the world (ibid., p. 48). Because of this unity, pleasure and displeasure can be transferred to the external reality, which in its turn can be introjected. The introjection is a process of incorporation of the objects, which helps the individual to recover its strength and integrity. This is a considerable deviation from Freud to whom the boundaries between the individual and the outer world, the so-called principium individuations, are much more important. Even though Ferenczi states that the neurotic person may “dissipate” his energy this way (ibid., p. 52), the described mechanisms of projection and introjection and the vocabulary used indicate an abundance of inner energy. Ferenczi clearly adopts Nietzsche’s definition that life is “assimilation”, “overwhelming”, and “Einverleibung” (incorporation) (1886, p. 729). The individual -even the neurotic person- is not weak and helpless but full of a vital, powerful and highly dynamic libido that can easily transcend all boundaries and “overwhelm” the world. The libido is capable both of obtaining pleasure and satisfaction from the external reality and of leaving its signature on it. Ferenczi’s concept of the libido is an heir to Nietzsche’s “Will to Power”, which imposes its rules on the external reality (see “to expel still more of his ego into the outer

world" -Ferenczi, 1909, p. 48). While Freud underscored the individual's adjustment to the world (see ibid., p. 49), like Nietzsche, Ferenczi (1912a) highlighted the reverse mechanism -the assimilation of the external reality by the individual in order to "ease" the "tensions" of the individual's psyche (note 1 on p. 328). With this perspective, Ferenczi set the beginning of "object relations and intersubjectivity" (Haynal, 1993, p. 62), of interpersonal theory and the relational paradigm (Rudnytsky, 2002, p. 109; Poster, 2009, p. 202)

FROM "PHYSIOLOGY OF USE" TO "PHYSIOLOGY OF PLEASURE"

Ferenczi (1912b) located the interactions between the "psychic" and the "physiological" components of the individual and those between the individual organism and the external reality in a complex network of "coordinate axes" consisting of various "spaces" and "dimensions" (p. 197). It was his ambition to develop a "stereochemistry" (Ferenczi, 1922, p. 369) -a new spatial model of the configurations within the human organism and of its interactions with the external reality. In his stereochemistry, he re-evaluated the structure and the functions of body and soul as well as the role of pleasure, and transformed the "physiology of use" into a "physiology of pleasure".

Ferenczi begins with the so-called "transitory symptoms" -the expression of emotions via organic symptoms. Suffering manifests itself as "cardiac pains" (Ferenczi, 1912b, p. 198), emotional bitterness causes "a bitter feeling in the tongue" (p. 198), and "moral weakness" may cause a "weakness of the whole musculature or in certain groups of muscles" (pp. 200–201). The close link between mental and physical states is due to the fact that they are both representations of "ideas" (ibid., p. 199). However, for Ferenczi manifest forms were not distortions of those ideas but mostly agreeable, even beautiful, aesthetic forms. It is also notable that he did not set any real boundary between the body and the psyche (Bernfeld, 1937, p. 220) and made no clear distinction between them but considered them a continuous flow. Life is a flux, its essence is fluidity, and the organism is a coherent blend of freely floating states, which are hardly obstructed by any resistances.

Ferenczi pointed to the "physiological vicinity" between organs and modalities of expression (Ferenczi, 1912b, p. 210). Even distant or opposite organs or states of mind and body can find each other or represent each other this way -for example, a cough can represent suppressed laughter (ibid., p. 210). Ferenczi generously applies Freud's mechanism of "expression displacement" to the wandering of energies and ideas that have escaped "complete suppression" (ibid., p. 210). These notions are based on Ferenczi's deep conviction of the strength of the "pleasure sources of life" (ibid., p. 209), of love and laughter as the original basis of human life that cannot be dispelled or destroyed (see also Lothane, 1998). Even though Ferenczi assumed that the ideas lie at the basis of all material manifestations, unlike Plato who thought that the material world was only a distant, pale and shadowy reflection of the eternal ideas (see his cave allegory), Ferenczi, like Nietzsche, strongly delineated the vitality, power, and high aesthetic value of this reflection. Thus, in his writings, the material world becomes an arena of various relations between its components, or the scene of a friendly, sometimes artistic cooperation.

A formidable instrument used by human beings to influence their surroundings and to communicate their needs and ideas is the spoken word, which is viewed by Ferenczi as omnipotent and as a "motor power" (1913, note 22 on p. 231). Yet human speech is not limited to verbal language but relates to the whole organism: for example, "the suppressed speech" reappears as "ventriloquism (Bauchreden)" (Ferenczi, 1912b, p. 211). Where the verbal speech fails, the body begins to speak. Ferenczi found a way out of the crisis of language that clearly manifested itself in European society and culture at the turn of the century (Ajouri, 2009, pp. 147–162), and put an end to it by letting the whole organism speak: nature is not mute at all, but vibrant with the need to express itself and bubbling with joy. Body language and the communication between body organs belong to the most characteristic and extravagant features of Ferenczi's model and are impressively summarized by him in the formula "Uterus loquitur" (1919b, p. 103). This communication is possible because of the close connections between the organs which are "associated" (Ferenczi, 1912a, p. 120) and enter into various relationships. Language evolves as a reciprocal exchange between the individual and the surrounding world: the world is a reflection and expression of the human body, an "image of his corporeality" (Ferenczi, 1913, p. 228), while at the same time the individual uses and reproduces "the whole multifariousness of the outer world" (p. 228) in order to develop his own language and means of

expression. Thus, Ferenczi offers a unique model of language formation based on lust for life and universal interrelations. Language is a very comprehensive phenomenon, with body language being its powerful basis. Like the human organism, language is a living body and not a dead instrument.

Another significant component of his "physiology of pleasure" is Ferenczi's theory of art, based mainly on the poetic figure "pars pro toto" (1909, p. 43), the idea that every part of the body is capable of representing the whole organism, and on the principle of homology, which he derived from Goethe's natural science -the structural similarity between organs and organisms, which points to their universal interconnectedness (see also Bernfeld, 1937, p. 217).

Ferenczi (1915) added to Freud's analysis of wit and dreams his own analysis of comparisons and similes, explaining their origin with a "too powerful excitation of an affect" (p. 402). He introduced several new concepts related to pleasure -the "pleasure of the resemblance" ("Lust an der Ähnlichkeit"), the "pleasure in repetition" ("Wiederholungslust"), and the "pleasure in rediscovery" ("Wiederfindungslust") (ibid., p. 406), which echoed Nietzsche's principle of the "eternal recurrence" and offered a positive, pleasurable alternative to Freud's term "repetition compulsion". Besides, he saw the "pleasure of rediscovery" as a form of protection against the vicissitudes of life. Like symbols, allegories and parables help us re-discover "what is loved in all the things of the hostile outer world" (ibid., p. 407). So while Freud had shown how the libido turns into anxiety (see Ferenczi, 1919a, p. 331), Ferenczi set out to transform the anxiety back to love and pleasure. Literary genres have a relaxing and potentially traumatolytic effect and are part of the process of "psychic assimilation" and introjection of the world, and of its sublimation. Ferenczi places aesthetics between pain and pleasure, between reality principle and pleasure principle. This aesthetic attitude also helped him to dispense with the cruelty typical of Nietzsche's concept of "Einverleibung". A good example of Ferenczi's aesthetic attitude is his idea that the body behaves like "an artist" who "moulds the material of his conception" according to its ideas (1919b, p. 96).

Aesthetics is a product of human physiology, which is determined by complicated associations and links of the organs. But despite the various connections of the organs, there is a certain hierarchy in the human organism since the libido is not evenly or equally distributed (Ferenczi, 1916/1917, p. 83). Mental processes, body organs, and zones are classified according to their "specific pleasure gravity" (Ferenczi, 1912a, p. 331). There are "zones" of high libidinal energies and of condensation of the libido, for example the eye which is "powerfully charged with libido" and has a direct link to the genitals (Ferenczi, 1916/1917, p. 84). Accordingly, Ferenczi (1912a) postulates the existence of "pleasure spaces" in the organism (p. 331). Thus the organs are linked with each other not by rational principles but by their pleasure status. Ferenczi's "topology of pleasure" views the genitals as the "central organ" of pleasure (1916/1917, p. 85) and as a "nucleus" (p. 86) radiating pleasure to all the other organs. Whereas Freud limited the eroticism of adults to the genitals, Ferenczi gives every part of the body a share of pleasure and a direct link to the libidinal center.

The "specific pleasure gravity" of different phenomena is also the basis of Ferenczi's "physiological economics" in which money and gold are analyzed as a substitute for the pleasurable play of children with their excrements, and the "capitalistic instinct" is a pleasurable expression of "anal-erotic" play (1914, p. 331). Next to linguistics, aesthetics, and economics, Ferenczi (1925) subordinated ethics as well to his libido theory and to the pleasure principle: like Nietzsche, he wanted to "revaluate all values" and develop a new, hedonistic "physiological morality" (p. 267) focused on the morals of the body, for example on the "sphincter-play" (p. 268). Yet, Ferenczi (1913) considerably modified Nietzsche's ideas: the "grasping hand" (p. 216) that reaches out into the world is not guided by the "Will to Power", but is a playful, loving hand. While Nietzsche discredited the "morals of use" ("Nützlichkeits-Moral") as "the morality of the slave" and advocated "master morality" ("Herrenmoral") (Nietzsche, 1886, p. 732), Ferenczi's "morality of pleasure" is the morality of universal love.

"PHYSIOLOGY OF PLEASURE" AND TRAUMA

Ferenczi's trauma theory and its impact on contemporary psychoanalysis have been widely acknowledged in the last decades (see Haynal, 1989; Dupont, 1998; Frankel, 1998; Kilborne, 1999; Rudnytsky, 2002; Peláez, 2009; Mészáros, 2010). As Peláez (2009) points out, "Ferenczi's keen interpretation and theorization of

trauma differs significantly from Freud's first trauma theory and presents ideas that enrich our understanding of the symptoms and suffering of traumatized patients…" (p. 1222).

Ferenczi applied Freud's model of narcistic regression to organic disease in order to account for the phenomena of regeneration and healing. Ferenczi was very "sensitive to suffering and despair" (Haynal, 2000, p. 29), he had "the passion to heal" (Hoffer, 1991, p. 468), so regeneration and healing processes always stood at the center of his interests. He showed that in the event of organic disease, the libido flows to the diseased organ in an effort of the organism to activate all energies and to heal the trauma (see, e.g., "libido mobilized by the cerebral lesion" -Ferenczi, 1922, p. 353). Yet in contrast to Freud, Ferenczi had a definitely organismic view: the human body is a whole and not an aggregation of single parts, and it strives to preserve its integrity and equilibrium.

In Ferenczi's model, genital energy has the highest status -not only because of its significant "pleasure gravity", but also because of its archaic character. It draws strength from the past and from the "protopsyche" (Ferenczi, 1919b, p. 97), which is a "primal form" ("Urform") in the sense outlined by Goethe in his "Metamorphosis of Plants" (1790). Regression to these primal times and forms of existence is a healthy mechanism. The genital forces are primal, "gross" and "over-powerful" while the psychic structures of the "higher psychic layers" (Ferenczi, 1919b, p. 99) are subtle, fragile, and susceptible to trauma. Ferenczi (1922) highlighted the cooperation between the genitals and the brain, which is the "organ of the intellect" and of "the ego functions" (p. 353), but he still gave preference to "the organ" of the pleasure principle. Being a "central organ", the genitals are a never-resting "coalescence of all erotisms" (Ferenczi, 1919b, p. 99) capable of healing trauma.

It is notable that even though he turned to trauma as etiology, Ferenczi (1924b) still thought positively of trauma by assuming that a certain amount of trauma within an "optimum" even protects the organism from "abnormality" (p. 77). While processes of destruction are often upsetting and are presented by Ferenczi by "a whole series of images" (Dupont, 1998, p. 235), they are never final and complete -there always remains an intact "nucleus" that keeps the organism together (Ferenczi, 1922, p. 368). Even in the event of trauma, surplus libido exceeding "the level required by the curative tendencies" to heal the trauma can be found (ibid., p. 355). In contrast to Freud, whose "economy of libido" is one of shortage and deficiency ("Mangelökonomie"), the libido as described by Ferenczi is an almost inexhaustible natural force. Even a decrease of libido and a "libido empoverishment" is not "the end of the world" (ibid., p. 362), since it can be overcome via regression to archaic stages. The sources of rebirth and re-vitalization lie in the pre-traumatic past. Following Haeckel's rule of re-capitulation that "ontogenesis is a brief and rapid recapitulation of phylogenesis" (1900, p. 81), Ferenczi posits that the past can re-appear even in the course of copulation, which resembles the paradise-like life in the womb -and on a phylogenetic level- life before the great catastrophe.

Coping with trauma and catastrophe requires the restoration of the unity of the individual, and the libido is the "agglutinant" (Ferenczi, 1922, p. 368) that binds together the torn-apart organism. In Ferenczi's concept of amphimixis developed in *Thalassa*, different innervations mesh together, become interchangeable, and begin to speak the same language. He compares "erotisms" such as stuttering and "anomalies of seminal emission" on the basis of their "fundamental similarity" (Ferenczi, 1924a, p. 8). "Transposition" (ibid., p. 13), "interoperation" (p. 11), "coordination" (p. 9), and unification are the main principles of amphimixis, which is based on Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire's "theory of unity of organic composition" ("unité de composition organique") (1830, p. 49), and on Goethe's (1820, p. 191) and Schopenhauer's (1819, p. 158) idea of the "unity in the multiplicity" ("Einheit in der Vielheit"). In *Thalassa*, the organs still retain their "qualitative individuality" (Ferenczi, 1924a, p. 11) but they "learn" to give up pleasure or to borrow pleasure from other organs (p. 12). They behave in a very controlled, altruistic way. Ferenczi uses the metaphor of the fire to illustrate the interconnectedness of the organs that are fueled by erotic fire: "It is as though the individual erotogenic zones were smouldering fires connected by a fuse which finally sets off the explosion of the charge of instinctual energy accumulated in the genital" (1924a, p. 15). But despite this metaphor, Ferenczi rejects the idea of a possible anarchy of the body organs. Sabourin (1985, p. 103) praised the carnevalesque quality of Ferenczi's vision and viewed Thalassa as an "orgiastic feast of the body organs" ("une fête orgiaque des organes"), which is hardly correct: the communication and cooperation between

the body organs in *Thalassa* are not marked by the limitless freedom and anarchy typical of carnival in the sense of Bakhtin (1985). On the contrary, Ferenczi limits the liberty of the individual organs and presents a centralistic vision of their alliance in order to guarantee the salvation of the whole organism. The voices of the organs fuse as they gather around the genital with which they identify and which acts as their leader (Ferenczi, 1925, p. 269) -an idea reminiscent of Freud's "Mass Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego" (1921). The previously "free-floating" energies are being balanced and "equalized" (Ferenczi, 1924a, p. 19) in the act of copulation while pleasure is being dispersed from the genitals to the whole body. Despite the traumatic situation, the act of copulation with its traumatolytic power (Sabourin, 1985, p. 91) puts the focus on pleasure again. Yet, the relative autonomy of the parts of the body is being sacrificed -including even "autotomy" (Ferenczi, 1924a, pp. 35–36)- for the sake of balance, protection, and harmony.

Following Cuvier (1817), Ferenczi (1924a) offers a specific perspective on life and evolution -via catastrophe, trauma, destruction, and "autotomy" (p. 28). In these neo-vitalistic insights that also draw on Hans Driesch's and Jacques Loeb's experiments, Ferenczi once again followed Nietzsche (1882) who defined life as dispensing with everything in ourselves that is "weak and old" and that "wants to die" (p. 59). Recovery from trauma is a process of "adaptation" (Ferenczi, 1924a, p. 54) and re-organization, and as Ferenczi states in 1926 echoing Sabina Spielrein, destruction is a healthy mechanism and "the cause of being" (p. 377).

Ferenczi compared the treatment of trauma with the process of converting a tragedy "into a drama with a 'happy ending'" (1930, p. 125). In the case of external trauma, which was the focus of Ferenczi's work toward the end of his life, the body gets silent while suffering, even "dying" circulate in the organism (1931, p. 139) of the patient who feels "lonely and abandoned in his greatest need" (1933, p. 160). In the process of traumatic fragmentation and atomization, the organs have been estranged and disconnected from each other (ibid., p. 165). But the organism still finds its way back to life and pleasure -for example via *identification with the aggressor* (see Frankel, 2002; Peláez, 2009; Howell, forthcoming), when the suffering is turned into a pleasurable, "dreamlike state" (Ferenczi, 1933, p. 162), by employing the autoplastic abilities of the organism in mimicry (p. 163), and via regression "into the state of happiness that existed prior to the trauma" (p. 164). Ferenczi displays several modes of coping with trauma with even the negative ones like anaesthesia, complete silence, or autotomy leading to a miraculous "rise of new faculties" (ibid., p. 164).

In Ferenczi's *Clinical Diary*, the previous Dionysian hilarity is also replaced by the horrors and the suffering of dismemberment and by the silence of destruction. But like Rheia who assembled the fragments of Dionysus and revived him, Orpha -a healing agent and a principle of salvation- rescues the traumatized person and restores the unity of the organism. Like Schopenhauer's (1819) Will, Orpha is a unifying principle that lies beyond time and space. But unlike Schopenhauer's Will, which is a chaotic, evil principle, Orpha is an organizing, good, and caring principle. When everything has been shattered, there is still a savior -a motherly "guardian" angel incorporating "the organizing life instincts" (Ferenczi, 1932, p. 8), love and security (Smith, 1999). Orpha is an eternal, tender savior who guarantees the preservation of life and re-establishes the universal "state of equilibrium" (Ferenczi, 1932, p. 5). And "the undefatigable Orpha" (ibid., p. 10) is also a synonym of Elpis, the goddess of hope who appears at the end of Goethe's poem "Primal Words: Orphic" (1817/1818) -a text that has crystallized in many ways in Ferenczi's writings- to repair the harm done by the inexorable Ananke, another protagonist of this poem.

ΕΛΠΙΣ, Hope

…
Yet the repulsive gate can be unbolted
Within such bounds, their adamantine wall,
Though it may stand, that gate, like rock for ever;
One being moves, unchecked, ethereal:
From heavy cloud, from fog, from squall of rain
She lifts us to herself, we're winged again,
You know her well, to nowhere she's confined
A wingbeat -aeons vanish far behind. (ibid., pp. 359–360)

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Ferenczi was "his own most persistent and determined critic" (Aron and Harris, 1993, p. 23) and admitted some of his failures himself: the psychomorphism and animism (Ferenczi, 1924a, p. 2) of his theory, his excessive use of analogies that can be "no secure basis" of scientific work (Bernfeld, 1937, p. 197). Ferenczi developed a relatively consistent theory and therapeutic practice, based on a number of philosophic and scientific assumptions of previous thinkers. In his imaginative speculations, he returned to the philosophy of nature of Goethe, Oken, Schopenhauer and German romanticism and adopted from them along with the old, Neo-Platonic idea that nature speaks to us ("natura loquitur") some of their mysticism as well.

In his "physiology of pleasure", Ferenczi subordinated all the spheres discussed by him to his main principle, the libido -the nucleus of his theory and therapy. Thus, the reality principle became only a "modification of the pleasure principle" (Ferenczi, 1924a, p. 89), and the use or disuse of body organs that is fundamental to Lamarck's theory of evolution became irrelevant. In this one-sided libidinization of science and in the dominance of a single, superordinate idea, Ferenczi's theory shows a considerable affinity to "Weltanschauungen" (see Freud's definition of a "Weltanschauung" in Freud (1933, p. 170)). Nevertheless, Ferenczi's "utraquistic" method -the "reciprocal analogizing" of different sciences (Ferenczi, 1924a, introduction, p. 3) and "the fusion of science and humanism" (Rudnytsky, 2002, p. 128)- was a unique and courageous effort to link sciences together and to put an end to their isolation.

As Bernfeld (1937) pointed out, Ferenczi created "powerful images" of the impressive "beauty" of the human organism (p. 213). Ferenczi's emphasis on the plasticity and the adaptability of the body organs as well as his evolutionary perspective were a brilliant achievement indeed. While outlining negative factors like internal and external trauma and the traumatic conflicts and collisions between society and the individual, in his innovative "physiology" Ferenczi not only radically broke with analytic neutrality (Fortune, 1993, p. 102) by demonstrating the crucial role of the therapist for the restoration of the integrity and the equilibrium of the patient in the face of traumatic fragmentation (Haynal, 1993, p. 65), but he also highlighted the importance of factors such as pleasure, joy, love, freedom, and natural vigor. In a historic period obsessed with decline, degeneration (see, e.g., Spengler 1918/1922), and war, Ferenczi developed an optimistic program of evolution, regeneration, and growth—an achievement that makes him "unquestionably one of the most brilliant orbs in the psychoanalytic firmament" (Rudnytsky, 2002, p. 109).

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(**) A version of this paper was presented at the International Ferenczi Conference, Faces of Trauma, in Budapest, May 31–June 3, 2012.

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Published in: The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, 2013, 73, (339–352) © 2013 Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis 0002-9548/13.

Electronic version: www.palgrave-journals.com/ajp/
DOI:10.1057/ajp.2013.23

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