ABSTRACT

The German pronoun Es has been used by Georg Groddeck since 1909 to represent the totality of the human being, a concept that allowed him to consider both mind and body together from a conceptual and therapeutic perspective. In 1923 - a month after the issue of Groddeck’s most famous book - *The Ego and the Id* was published, where Freud resumed Groddeck’s term with a much more restrictive meaning that has obscured the original one. Groddeck was very disappointed but continued to develop his own concept of *das Es*, which is significantly akin to the Jungian *Selbst* (self) mainly because of their common cultural background, with a prominent reference to Carus’ and Nietzsche’s conception of the unconscious. In 1977, similar ideas have reemerged in psychoanalysis with Kohut’s ‘self psychology,’ which nevertheless presents a more personalistic orientation.

KEYWORDS: Groddeck; id; it; Kohut; psychosomatics; self

RESUMEN

El pronombre alemán *Es* había sido utilizado por Georg Groddeck desde 1909 para representar la totalidad del ser humano, un concepto que le permitió considerar la mente y el cuerpo juntos desde una perspectiva conceptual y terapéutica. En 1923 - un mes después de la edición del libro más famoso de Groddeck - se publicó *El Yo y el Ello*, donde Freud reconsideró el término de Groddeck con un significado mucho más restrictivo que ha oscurecido al original. Groddeck estaba muy decepcionado, pero continuó desarrollando su propio concepto del Ello (*das Es*), el cual es muy similar al *Self* junguiano (*das Selbst*) debido principalmente al trasfondo cultural común, con una importante referencia a la concepción del inconsciente de Carus y Nietzsche. En 1977, ideas similares han resurgido en el psicoanálisis con la “psicología del self” de Kohut, la cual sin embargo presenta una orientación más personalista.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Groddeck; Id, Ello, das Es; Kohut; psicosomática; Si mismo, Self, das Selbst.

If Georg Walther Groddeck (1866–1934) is universally considered to be the founder of modern psychosomatic medicine, concerning his contributions to the theory of psychoanalysis she is almost exclusively acknowledged for the historical importance of introducing the term *Es* (**′id′** in English) used by Freud in his second topography, presented in *The Ego and the Id* (1923). Freud attributes the name of *Es* to the unconscious parts of the psyche ‘by following Groddeck […] who is never tired of insisting that what we call our ego behaves essentially passively in life, and that, as he expresses it, we are “lived” by unknown and uncontrollable forces’ (1923, p. 23). In this structural model, an individual is, therefore ‘a psychical id [Es], unknown and unconscious, upon whose surface rests the ego’ (Freud, 1923, p. 24).

GRODDECK–FREUD: A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP

This official introduction into psychoanalysis of the term *das Es* - which, in German, is the singular neutral pronoun - also includes a footnote in which Freud writes: ‘Groddeck himself no doubt followed the example of Nietzsche, who habitually used this grammatical term for whatever in our nature is impersonal and, so to speak, subject to natural law’ (1923, p. 23, note 3). When Freud adopted this term in *The Ego and the Id*,
Groddeck had already used it for 13 years: in fact, Groddeck wrote about it for the first time in his essay *Von der Sprache* [Language], in which he wrote: ‘There is no such thing as an I; it is a lie, a distortion, to say: “I think, I live.” It should be: “it thinks, it lives.” Es, that is the great mystery of the universe’ (1909a, p. 254).

Groddeck approached psychoanalysis in 1913, reading *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* and *The Interpretation of Dreams*, then, on 27 May 1917, he wrote directly to Freud and began an epistolary exchange that lasted until 1934, the year of his death. In his first letter, Groddeck presented the theory he had come to, not through the treatment of neuroses, but by dealing with organic pathologies:

Long before […]1909 I had become convinced that the distinction between body and mind is only verbal and not essential, that body and mind are one unit, that they contain an Es, a force which lives in us while we believe we are living. Naturally I cannot claim this idea for myself, either, yet it was and is the basis of my activity. In other words, from the first I rejected a separation of bodily and mental illnesses, tried to treat the individual patient, das Es in him, and attempted to find a way into the unexplored and inaccessible regions. I am aware of the fact that I am at least close to the mystical approach, if not actually engaged in it. And yet simple facts force me to continue on this way. (Freud & Groddeck, 1988, pp. 32–33)

In the same letter, Groddeck presented two more points, which for the rest of his life he never abandoned. The first is that the activity of the physician is limited to ‘treatment; it is not he who brings about the cure, it is the Es’ (Freud & Groddeck, 1988, p. 33). The second is the conviction that the concept of unconscious was too limited in Freud’s work, as he ‘expressly’ restricted its meaning (Freud & Groddeck, 1988). On 5 June 1917, Freud wrote to him that ‘there is no need to extend the concept of the unconscious in order to make it cover your experience of organic illnesses’ (Freud & Groddeck, 1988, p. 37), because in *The Unconscious* (Freud, 1915), to which Groddeck referred in his letter, Freud maintained that he had not mentioned the assumption that the unconscious act exerts an intensive, decisive influence on somatic processes such as conscious acts never do. […] Thus, while I would like to hold out both my hands to you to receive you as a colleague, there is only one disturbing circumstance, the fact that you have not managed to overcome the trivial ambition of claiming originality and priority. If you are so sure of the autonomy of your acquisitions why do you still need originality? Anyway, can you be sure in this respect? You must be 10 or 15 or perhaps 20 years younger than I am (1856). (Freud & Groddeck, 1988, p. 37)

In this letter, Freud then critically asked Groddeck why he pushed himself ‘into mysticism, [you] cancel the distinction between mental and somatic, commit yourself to philosophical theories which are not called for?’ (Freud & Groddeck, 1988, pp. 37–38). Even though, Freud himself recognized a few sentences later, ‘Certainly, the unconscious is the proper mediator between the somatic and the mental, perhaps the long-sought “missing link”’ (Freud & Groddeck, 1988, p. 38).

This first exchange of letters between Freud and Groddeck outlines the kind of reciprocal reservations that will characterize their scientific relationship, marked -as Grossman and Grossman (1965, p. 87) write- by long and frequent letters, in which there were almost always references to das Es. Nevertheless, their disagreement remained. Inevitably, this contrast also affected their personal relationships, further complicated by Groddeck’s paternal transference, which in the epistolary emerges toward Freud without reticence. However, the correspondence continued to be intense, and in spite of the reservations, it shows Freud’s consideration of Groddeck. In his letter of 17 April 1921, Freud explained that he understood why Groddeck thought the concept of Es was necessary: ‘I feel the same. Yet I have a special talent for being satisfied with the fragmentary. For the unconscious is merely something phenomenal, a sign in place of a better acquaintanceship’ (Freud & Groddeck, 1988, p. 58). Moreover, after raising the problem of the unconscious parts of the Ego, which he would publish in *The Ego and the Id*, Freud recognized that ‘The more correct notion thus seems to be that the categories and hierarchies observed by us only apply to relatively superficial layers, and not to the depth for which your “Es” is the right name’ (Freud & Groddeck, 1988, p. 58). Freud followed this explanation by a drawing, similar to that which he would reproduce in The Ego and the Id (1923, p. 24). This letter, therefore, represents the crucial point of Freudian reflection following the stimuli received by Groddeck, a reflection that evidently contributed to the transition from the first to the second
topography. However, the spirit that animated Freud was more in the sense of conservation -most likely because he then approached the critical age of 67, fatalistically related to the meaning of retirement or even death- as it was also revealed in his letter to Groddeck of 29 May 1921:

But now I have to tell you frankly, and I am even confident that you won’t tell anyone else prematurely: in reality one has only a single need in old age, a need for rest. It is a quite transparent calculation. Since I shall not be able to pick the fruit of this tree I shall not bother to plant it. Mean but honest. One does not want to learn anything new any more, but one also does not get any real pleasure out of old things either. [...] What one has achieved oneself is unfinished, fragmentary, provisional; one ought to have a second life in order to improve on it. (Freud & Groddeck, 1988, pp. 60–61)

When Groddeck – whose Das Buch vom Es (1923a) had been published for only a month – had a way of reading Freud’s Das Ich und das Es (1923), he was deeply disappointed with how Freud had used his term Es, and, on 27 May 1923, wrote a bitter letter to him (Freud & Groddeck, 1988, p. 80). Grossman and Grossman (1965, p. 132) argue that Groddeck, for the first time, realized that Freud had declined to accept the position of father and remained frustrated for this reason.

From critical studies comparing the official version and the private version (resulting from the epistolary) of the entry of the term Es into the Freudian system, the awareness among scholars has become increasingly stronger that, as Will (1985, p. 150) states, ‘The origin of das Es represents a dark chapter in the history of the formation of psychoanalytic theories.’ In a very critical way, Nitzschke resumes the footnote of The Ego and the Id above, in which Freud refers to Nietzsche’s priority in the use of Es expression, to argue that, in this way, ‘the reader is induced to think that Groddeck was not particularly original when in 1923 he inserted the term Es in the title of his book’ (1983, pp. 770–771). In addition, Nitzschke points out that, later in New Introductory Lectures, when Freud introduces the term Es he mentions Nietzsche before Groddeck, meaning that Nietzsche was the source for both of them, thus further reducing Groddeck’s priority (Nitzschke, 1983, p. 771).

DAS ES

It is obvious that this pronoun is currently used in German, but it turns out to be interesting to identify those authors, prior to Groddeck, who expressed this similar concept. Nitzschke (1983, p. 800) traces the expression Es denkt (It thinks) in Feuerbach (1846). Furthermore, Nietzsche states that von Hartmann (1869, p. 34) quoted a phrase by Bastian (1868) – ‘That we are not thinking, but that it [Es] in us thinks, is clear to anyone who is accustomed to paying attention to what is happening in us’ – commenting: ‘This Es is however...in the unconscious’ (von Hartmann, cited by Nitzschke, 1983, p. 798). In the philosophical field, Goldmann (1985, p. 103) also finds this term in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, published in 1781. However, the most important author is Nietzsche, whose sister, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, was personally known by Groddeck (Goldmann, 1985, p. 112), and moreover August Koberstein, Groddeck’s grandfather, a famous Germanist, was director of the College of Schulpforta when Nietzsche attended it. Nietzsche was then often present at home Koberstein [...] he was considered a god in the family of origin of Groddeck’s parents. [...] Groddeck undoubtedly knew his main works, such as Zarathustra and Beyond Good and Evil, [and] undoubtedly was strongly influenced by them. (Will, 1985, p. 157)

In fact, between some passages of Nietzsche and the conception of Groddeck’s Es there is a great affinity: Kerz points out the Nietzschean concept of the ‘limit’ of consciousness to access the unconscious, whereby ‘All that consciousness, “I think”, may know of das Es is the thought of the “limit as limit”’ (1985, p. 134). In addition, in the speech of Zarathustra ‘The Despisers of the Body’, there are statements very close to Groddeck’s subsequent psychosomatic ideas:

‘I,’ you say, and are proud of that word. But greater is that in which you do not wish to believe– your body with its great intelligence; [...] Always das Selbst listens and seeks; it compares, overpowers, conquers, and destroys. It rules, and is also the ruler of the ‘I’. Behind your thoughts and feelings, my
brother, stands a mighty ruler, an unknown sage – it is called the subconscious Selbst; it dwells in your body, it is your body. (Nietzsche, 1883, pp. 31–32)

Apparently, and emphasized by Will (1985, p. 157), there is a remarkable analogy between Nietzsche’s Selbst and das Es by Groddeck, who occasionally uses the term Selbst with the same meaning as Es:

Everyone should be certainly clear that das Selbst is something different from the Ego […] The totality of man, instead, is das Selbst. We know that quite well, everyone knows it. But no one lives it: we are all enchanted by the idea of the ‘Ego’. (1927, p. 158)

To confirm the close bond between Nietzsche and Groddeck, Will (1985, p. 157) recalls that the first programming page of Groddeck’s private magazine Satanarium ended with this quote of Zarathustra: ‘Your subconscious Selbst laughs at your “I”, and its bold leaps’ (Nietzsche, 1883, p. 32). But Will also maintains that Nietzsche’s criticism of the ego -expressed by Es denkt (It thinks)- will then tend to remain in the background, while Groddeck makes it the cornerstone of his thought.

Von Röder (1961) emphasizes that, since 1909, Groddeck had used the pantheistic view of Gottnatur (God Nature) by Goethe and, in Hin zu Gottnatur (1909b) he spoke for the first time of das Es as ‘the great mystery of the world’. Groddeck widely used the term Gottnatur until his encounter with psychoanalysis: Meng (1935) believes that its content is the forerunner of das Es and Will explains how it happened: ‘Until 1913 Groddeck spoke occasionally and in a non-programmatic way of das Es. Since 1917 here fused Gottnatur’s existential speculative argument also linguistically; in his place the expression Es appears’ (Will, 1985, p. 158). I find it interesting to add that Martynkewicz (1997, p. 204) reports that in 1904 Wilhelm Bölše had written about the concept of das Es in an essay, Die Auferstehung des Religiösen durch die Kunst (The Resurrection of Religion through Art) in a magazine that Groddeck knew well. Since this Es by Bölše is an inner principle unifying body and spirit, recalling Goethe’s Gottnatur, Martynkewicz (1997, p. 205) suggests that Groddeck has been stimulated by this essay, also because it prefigures the notion of the totality of the human being.

In any case, a solid cultural background gives Groddeck’s Es a remarkable philosophical thickness,4 which fits in the wake of the most authoritative German-language writers who have relativized the role of consciousness. From this point of view, it may seem that Freud’s and Groddeck’s positions essentially coincide, but actually Freud had always criticized Groddeck’s ‘Es mythology’ (1988, p. 96) and his ‘pan-psychism which borders on mysticism,’ proposing instead an agnostic attitude positivistically tied to ‘reason and science’ (Freud & Groddeck, 1988, p. 72). On the contrary, Groddeck defended his own ‘unreasonableness’ (Freud & Groddeck, 1988, p. 64), so that ‘Freud and Groddeck mean different things with the term Es: basically, Groddeck did not like to give scientificity to a discovery and then emphasized that behind his Es actually hid the divine’ (Meng, 1934, p. 409).

The concept of totality inherent to Groddeck’s Es was completely extraneous to Freud, who theorized the primacy of the ego, expressed in his famous therapeutic programme: ‘Where id [Es] was, there ego shall be’ (Freud, 1932–1933, p. 79). Thus, the differences between Freud and Groddeck were rooted in their different philosophies of life. Freud was well aware of this as he wrote on 18 June 1925: ‘Everything from you is interesting to me, even if I may not follow you in detail. I do not, of course, recognize my civilized, bourgeois, demystified Es in your Es. Yet you know that mine derived from yours’ (Freud & Groddeck, 1988, p. 93. For a thorough comparison between Freud’s and Groddeck’s theories, see Laplanche, 1981, pp. 142–166).

**FREUD’S AND GRODDECK’S CORRESPONDENCES**

In this letter, as in many others, Freud’s particularly conciliatory attitude towards Groddeck emerges, which makes the Grossmans (1965, p. 202) believe that Freud had recognized the type of transference that he himself had upon Fliess and Groddeck; both were friendships with predominantly epistolary characteristics. However, it should be remembered that in the years 1906–1913 -with a temporal interposition between the correspondence with Fliess(1887–1902) and the beginning of the exchange of letters with Groddeck(1917)-
Freud had an important correspondence with Jung (McGuire, 1974). The first letter was from Freud on 11 April 1906, just to thank Jung for sending a research book on associative tests with six papers written by Jung and other psychiatrists of the Zurich University. Jung wrote his first letter on 5 October 1906. Freud and Jung met personally in Vienna on 3 March 1907.

Therefore, in addition to having written a large amount of private and professional letters to other people, Freud had a succession of three correspondents with whom he had established particular scientific and affective relationships, in spite of the absolute prevalence of epistolary exchanges with respect to personal encounters. With Fliess the letters were interspersed with meetings, while Freud only met Jung and Groddeck a few times. To understand such a state of affairs, we can extend what Musatti (1974, p. viii) observes in reference to Jung to Groddeck, namely that

it is necessary […] to refer not only to the custom of the time, in which the letter preserved a relevance that is no longer present, but also to a particular propensity for the written dialogue above all in Freud.

However, the first two correspondences -as it is known- had been characterized by a break, and Freud already had a traumatic experience with Fliess (Masson, 1985) which likely conditioned the two successive relationships and, therefore, to a maximum extent for Groddeck. Consistent with these my assumptions of 1993 is the recent paper by Poster (2009, p. 200) stating:

Another reason that Freud may have been wary of emotionally investing in a personal friendship with Groddeck was Freud's disappointment in his broken relationship with Jung, another Christian physician whom Freud also considered to be too interested in ‘mysticism’.

It is thus possible to compare the relationship Freud had with Jung to that he had with Groddeck. And not just as much as Schur (1972, p. 312) wrote: ‘Freud had been caught up by Jung’s imagination, and now the work of Georg Groddeck was impressing him greatly.’ But also in other respects, both personal and more strictly theoretical.

When Groddeck came into contact with Freud in 1917, Jung had left the psychoanalytic movement for more than four years. Jones and Pfister, and now Groddeck, remained the only Christians in Freud’s inner circle (Rudnytsky, 2002, p. 192). At the 6th International Congress of Psychoanalysis of 1920, Groddeck met Ferenczi: they established a correspondence and deep friendship that also involved a fruitful professional confrontation (Ferenczi & Groddeck, 2002; Fortune, 2002; Grossman & Grossman, 1965; Poster, 2009). On the contrary, it does not appear that Jung had direct contact with Groddeck. The only time Jung mentioned him is on the paper written in 1948 about the history of depth psychology, where Jung ([1948] 1951, p. 479) - describing the second Freudian topography- clarified that the concept of Es derives from Groddeck and is cited The Book of the It.

GEORG GRODDECK CONFRONTED WITH CARL GUSTAV JUNG

A common trait of Jung and Groddeck was the presence of a father complex: Jung was disappointed with his father (Jung, 1961, pp. 117–122) and Groddeck refused to accept the premature death of his (Grossman & Grossman, 1965, pp. 34–35 and 204). Their father complexes were remarkably important in their relationship with Freud, where they brought a considerable degree of ambivalence which can be found in the two correspondences. Jung and Groddeck also shared their Protestant origin, unlike most early analysts who had Jewish ascendance. Groddeck and Jung were deeply concerned with religious matters, and, for their theories, they had the common accusation by Freud of mysticism. Their orientation towards wholeness also led them to be interested in Eastern thought. The famous quotation made by Groddeck (1923a, p. 103) of the Sanskrit phrase Tat Tvam Asi demonstrates his knowledge of Indian culture. Translated ‘You are it’ or ‘Thou art that’, the word comes from the sixth century reading of the Chandogya Upanishad, one of the two
earliest Upanishads of Vedic religion, dated around the seventh to sixth century BCE. This phrase means that the Ātman (the original individual self) is identical with the Brahman (the ultimate reality), the origin of everything. Whereas Jung – starting from Symbols of Transformation (1911–12/1952) – carried out great research on religions of China, India, Japan, Tibet (Jung, 1936–1954), and even on Chinese alchemy (Jung, 1929b) and Kundalini Yoga (Jung, 1996).

In 1924, Groddeck treated Count Hermann Keyserling in his clinic and became friends with him (Martynkewicz, 1997, pp. 292–295). Afterwards, Groddeck was invited to lecture in the Schule der Weisheit (School of Wisdom), a centre for global, western and eastern culture, established in 1920 by Count Keyserling in Darmstadt, Germany. Important scholars met there annually, such as the sinologist Richard Wilhelm, the Indianpo et Tagore, the novelist Hermann Hesse, the theologian Paul Tillich, the psychologist Alfred Adler and – it is worth noting – Jung himself. Groddeck (1926d) lectured in his conference in September 1925 on Schicksal und Zwang (Destiny and Compulsion), reiterating his conception of the bondage of the human being with the cosmos. Whereas, Jung was presented to Count Keyserling probably in 1920 by the writer Oskar Schmitz, who was an admirer of Jung and would attend Jung’s seminar at the Tavistock Clinic in 1925 (1961, p. 446; McGuire, 1989, p. xiii). In the School of Wisdom, Jung presented in two conferences: in 1927 on Die Erdbedingtheit der Psyche (The Earth Conditioning of the Psyche) then subdivided into two parts (1928/1931a, 1928/1931b) and in 1930 on Archaic Man ([1930] 1931). Jung (1973) wrote 14 letters to Count Keyserling, the first on 21 May 1927 and the last on 10 December 1945 - as well as some reviews of his works - but Jung’s correspondence does not show any letter to or from Groddeck. Thus, while it is certain that both Jung and Groddeck attended the Darmstadt meetings, the years of their conferences were different, and if they did meet, there is no evidence.

When Groddeck and Jung came in contact with Freud, both of them were well-known medical doctors and had already outlined their broad interests: in 1906 Jung was 31 years old and had written some 25 papers, while in 1917 Groddeck was 51 and had about thirty publications. Jung was a Privat Dozent in psychiatry and First Oberarzt of the Burghölzli psychiatric hospital in Zurich, where he was second in position only to the director Eugen Bleuler. As a university clinician, Jung had already studied occult phenomena, hysteria and dementia praecox (schizophrenia), the word association test also for criminological purposes, and a psychological approach to psychotic patients (Ellenberger, 1994, p. 668; Jung, [1948] 1951, p. 481; Lewis, 1957). Groddeck was the favourite pupil of the most important German physician at that time, Ernst Schweninger. Since 1900, he had led as mall but very demanding clinic for chronic illnesses in Baden Baden, Sanitarium Marienhöhe, where he principally applied diets and physiotherapy techniques (Grossman & Grossman, 1965; Martynkewicz, 1997).

Groddeck and Jung were both deeply influenced by Romanticism. Moreover, the two thinkers who had a greater influence on Groddeck – Goethe and Nietzsche – were also fundamental to Jung. Jung had jokingly attributed the fascination for Goethe’s Faust to the legend that his grandfather – having the same name, Carl Gustav Jung – would be a natural son of Goethe (Jung, 1961, p. 53). And Nietzsche was one of the philosophers studied extensively by Jung since his university time:

Nietzsche kept his particular attention throughout the years […] From the spring of 1934 to the winter of 1939 Jung devoted one seminar each semester to Zarathustra. The collection of these seminars held at his Institute comprises ten typewritten volumes and certainly constitutes the most thorough commentary that has ever been given on Nietzsche’s masterpiece. (Ellenberger, 1994, p. 722)

For many years Nietzsche -together with Schopenhauer and von Hartmann—has been considered a philosophical reference to Jung (see Dry, 1961, p. 19); however, Nietzsche is the most important as Jung (1911–1912) cites him nineteen times in his turning book which sanctions the separation from Freud (only the latter has two more quotes). This wide appeal to the Nietzschean philosophy can be explained in the light of Bishop’s (1995, p. 193) assertion that Jung used Nietzsche to differentiate himself from Freud and to attack psychoanalysis (see also Huskinson, 2004, p. 148). Afterwards, Jung (1921, pp. 136–146) dedicated a chapter of *Psychological Types* to the antithesis between the Apollinian and the Dionysian from Nietzsche’s book *The Birth of Tragedy*. The Apollinian state produces dreaming, introspection and self-control; the Dionysian state causes intoxication, expansion and instinctive compelling -in Jungian terms they represent the pair of opposites of introversion and extroversion. Jung’s *Selbst* is the unifying center that coordinates all opposites present in the psyche and is defined by Bishop (1999, p. 224) as a ‘Dionysian Self’ because it is ‘founded on a Dionysian process of life, death and rebirth.’

Jung himself had ‘related the legend of Dionysos to the archetype of the Self’ (Bishop, 1999, p. 228) in a long passage of *Transformation Symbolism of the Mass* (Jung, 1942/1954, p. 264). It is important to stress that for Bishop (1999, p. 229) ‘the most significant point of coincidence between Nietzsche and Jung is their conception of the Self as a totality.’

A recent book by Huskinson examines Jung’s debt to Nietzsche in depth. She claims that the debt has received too little attention despite the fact that ‘the similarities between the thought of Nietzsche and Jung are obvious’ (2004, p. 1). She clarifies that Jung acknowledged Nietzsche’s influence on important topics such as ‘the autonomous and collective unconscious; the idea that an unconscious teleological process is at work within the individual to create the “true self”; and Nietzsche’s early theory of “typology”’ (Huskinson, 2004, p. 104). Huskinson suggests an equivalence between Nietzsche’s Übermensch*6* (synthesis of Apollinian and Dionysian) and Jung’s *Selbst* [Self] (synthesis of consciousness and unconsciousness) for both represent the realization of the healthy whole self as a union of opposites. She explains:

> both Nietzsche’s and Jung’s model of the whole self depend upon the productive and dynamic relationships maintained by opposites. Both the Übermensch and the Self seek the union of opposites and demand a relationship between opposites that generates the energy necessary to satisfy their vast creative capacities. (Huskinson, 2004, p. 69)

Ellenberger (1994, pp. 729 and 844) includes Eduard von Hartmann and Carl Gustav Carus among the philosophical predecessors of both Jung and Groddeck. Also for Alexander and Selesnick (1966, p. 392), Groddeck’s theory is essentially similar to that of Carus, who wrote: ‘The key to the knowledge of the nature of the soul’s conscious life lies in the realm of the unconscious. This explains the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of getting a real comprehension of the soul’s secret’ (C.G. Carus, Psiche, 1846. Eng. trans. in Ellenberger, 1994, p. 207).

Carus argued that the ‘formative unconscious’ develops after fecundation and directs the growth of the individual and the functions of his organs; whereas consciousness gradually arises, but remains under the influence of the unconscious, to which the individual periodically returns with sleep. In the romantic philosophical vision of Carus, the unconscious is in continual transformation, possesses its inherent wisdom and the power of healing nature, and allows -without being aware of it- a link with other individuals. Thus, the individual unconscious is related to the unconscious of all human beings. Carus distinguished three layers: the ‘general absolute unconscious,’ permanently inaccessible to consciousness; the ‘partial absolute unconscious,’ linked to organic processes and affective life; the ‘relative or secondary unconscious,’ including experiences that had once been conscious. The first two layers ‘may be compared to the Jungian notions of the collective unconscious and the individual unconscious, while the third seems to be anticipating more specifically the Freudian theory’ (Carotenuto, 1990, p. 40).
Groddeck (1920, p. 135) stated that ‘das Es contains parts of every lived phase of life, counted not only from fertilization but from ancestral times,’ approaching Jung’s archetypal conception. At the Berlin Psychoanalytic International Congress in 1922, Groddeck took a position in public, affirming that ‘there are in the human being forces which are not adequately covered by the term “unconscious”, as hither to used. [I suggest] to designate these forces, as yet undefined, by the word Es [It]’ (1923b). He attributed all the vital manifestations of the human being to das Es, including his thoughts and organic functions, and also ‘his psychic and physical diseases’ (Groddeck, 1923b).

Then, Groddeck’s view presents a remarkable correspondence with Carus, whose ‘notion of an autonomous, creative, compensatory function of the unconscious was to be emphasized half a century later by C.G. Jung’ (Ellenberger, 1994, p. 208). Groddeck also assumed that the content of consciousness corresponds to the opposite in the unconscious (Ellenberger, 1994, p. 844), another idea shared by Jung. Moreover, Groddeck and Jung attributed great importance to symbolization. Unlike the Freudian vision of an Es as ‘a chaos, a cauldron full of seething excitations’ (Freud, 1932–1933, p. 73), Groddeck claimed that ‘The unconscious expresses itself in symbols, sends them up to consciousness […] the symbol is a means by which the unconscious guides consciousness’ (1922, pp. 160 and 166). According to Groddeck, symbolization does not have the Freudian sense of result of intrapsychic conflicts related to repression:

Thus the symbol in Groddeck’s conception, has the function to convey unconscious drive to the consciousness, and forces the ego again to discharge it, by new symbol-creation -or by creation at all. His conception is that the unconscious, the reservoir of energy, has to discharge itself. This discharge occurs sometimes in direct action – and at other times it is only a projection, a vision, a picture, a symbol. But this projection still carries a charge of the genuine sparkle. Therefore it has still the power to create new, and again new pictures. It is not the process of ‘intellectual thinking’ but the process of the primitive phantasy-thinking which Groddeck describes when he says that the symbol creates a new symbol by association. (T. Benedek, 1940, manuscript quoted by Grotjahn, 1945, p. 20)

These two types of thought seem to be similar to the ‘two kinds of thinking ‘stated by Jung (1911–1912/1952, pp. 7–33) in Symbols of Transformation. Even the inexhaustibility of symbolic processes and the conception of a creative unconscious is approachable to a Jungian perspective: for Groddeck (1917, p. 45, 1926a, p. 200) das Es has ‘healing’ and ‘fermenting forces. 'Groddeck worked with the activation and liberation of the unconscious’ (Grotjahn, 1945, p. 22); he spoke of ‘reasons and finality of unconscious life’ (Groddeck, 1917, p. 39) and of ‘mysterious purposes’ of das Es (Groddeck, 1926a, p. 200). The difference with Freud is clear, as the characteristics of Freud’s Es (Id) ‘are supposedly only definable in negative terms -through contrast with the ego’s organizational mode’ (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1988, p. 198). On the contrary, Groddeck suggested using the term ‘intellect of das Es, so its expressions are similar to those of the conscious mind, but they are far superior to the latter’ (1917, p. 24).

It is now necessary to better define what Groddeck meant with the term Es, because many authors agree that it is not well defined, while others have erroneously identified it with the unconscious (among others, Taylor, 1987, p. 29; Vegetti Finzi, 1986, p. 235); perhaps because of the lack of rigour of Groddeck’s writings, but the ascendancy inevitably exerted by the Freudian Es (Id) may also be responsible. Instead, Groddeck (1933, p. 6) stated that the unconscious is not synonymous with das Es, which exists before the formation of the brain, an organ that makes repression possible: the unconscious is, therefore, a part of the psyche, while the psyche is a part of das Es. Indeed, at the Berlin Congress, Groddeck had argued that ‘the conscious and the preconscious systems, and ultimately the unconscious also, are to be conceived of as derivatives and sub-divisions of das Es’ (1923b). Thus, das Es represents an intellect other than consciousness, but also a wholeness which the various organs of the mind and body branch: ‘The individual Es of the human being includes conscious and unconscious and what cannot access consciousness, somatic and mental, the Ego and the instincts. All processes and phenomena of life are expressions of this Es’ (Groddeck, 1926b, p. 122).
DAS ES AND DAS SELBST

Groddeck’s descriptions of das Es are approachable to Jung’s Selbst (self) -not only for the aforementioned, that Groddeck sometimes used the two terms with the same meaning- because they are conceptually close, even if they come from different clinical experiences: for Jung, psychoses and in particular schizophrenia; for Groddeck, organic and especially chronic diseases.

Jung began to use the word Selbst in 1916 during a lecture on his discovery of an impersonal or collective part of the psyche and spoke of an ‘unconscious Selbst’ (1916). He afterwards described it as follows: ‘das Selbst is a quantity that is supraordinate to the conscious ego. It embraces not only the conscious but also the unconscious psyche, and is therefore, so to speak, a personality which we also are’ (Jung, 1928, para. 274). This term defines ‘the totality of man […] in accordance with Eastern philosophy’ (Jung, 1938/1940, p. 82). Yet, das Selbst includes instincts, but also physiological and semi-physiological phenomena (Jung, [1939] 1954, para. 808): it can, therefore, be asserted that both Groddeck’s Es and Jung’s Selbst are psychosomatic concepts, while the Freudian Es (Id) is a purely psychological concept (Rycroft, 1972, p. 79). Groddeck believed that das Es can express both physically and psychically: ‘the only difference that is difficult to explain, if not entirely inexplicable, is the manifestation of das Es, once in the psychic sphere, and another rather in the organic one’ (1926c, p. 215). Jung (1935, p. 4) stated that ‘psyche depends on body and body depends on psyche’ but was not interested in a deepening of das Selbst in a psychosomatic key; and he only sporadically dealt with the connection between psyche and organic pathologies (e.g. Jung [1935] 1936). Indeed, Jung’s research interests were always focused primarily on symbolism and individuation. Jung ([1946] 1947/1954, pp. 213–216) highlighted the psychosomatic constitution of the archetypes (das Selbst is the archetype of totality), above all through the concept of their ‘psychoidal’ nature but, after his death, some Jungian analysts have studied the psychosomatic aspects of das Selbst.

Jung regarded das Selbst as the center of the psyche -‘God within us’ (1928; para. 399. See: Bishop, 1999, p. 227; Homans, 1995, pp. 130–131) – an unknowable and indeterminable entity (Jung, 1928, p. 238, [1943] 1944, pp. 17–18, 1988, p. 127), while Groddeck (1926d, p. 61) stated: ‘Das Es is something indefinable, indeterminate, which is precisely for this indeterminacy it can be called Es’ and more, ‘an Es, a God, in us holds soul and body’ (Groddeck, 1917, p. 41).

Another common perspective of these two pioneers is finalism, as opposed to Freudian causalism. Jung ([1951] 1952, p. 459) wrote: das Selbst,

may mean per se, empirically it is an image of the goal of life spontaneously produced by the unconscious, irrespective of the wishes and fears of the conscious mind. It stands for the goal of the total man, for the realization of his wholeness and individuality.

While Groddeck (1917, p. 27) wrote: ‘The question: what for? has been for too long excluded from our medical thinking. Despite the bad reputation of every teleology, it is necessary to investigate the purpose of a man’s disease…why das Es’ has specific purposes.

Jung (1928, p. 237, 1958, pp. 460–461) had always argued that das Selbst is only a hypothesis of great utility to explain psychological phenomenology; Groddeck, too, had an empirical position, with the following paradox: ‘Not to be misunderstood, I will briefly comment on why I talk about an Es, if such an Es does not exist. This is because this fiction, this product of my doctor fantasy has an extraordinary practical value’ (1926d). In this regard, I would like to recall that both Jung and Groddeck always maintained therapeutic goals with a dialectical view of treatment. Their theories were the first too beyond Freud’s technique, switching to the “two-person” paradigm of relational theory [which] has by common consent now supplanted the “one-person” paradigm of ego psychology’ (Rudnytsky, 2002, p. 143; see also p. 179). In a relational perspective, in 1912, Jung had already suggested to Freud the ‘preventive analysis’ of future therapists, a proposal that Freud (1912, p. 116) received positively and later became a steady training analysis.

About the physical effectiveness of psychotherapy, Jung (1932, para. 494) recognized that meaningful words can even act on ‘biochemical’ processes of the organism, but only hinted at a psychotherapy of the
body (Lopez-Pedraza, 1977, p. 134 note 14). Groddeck, on the other hand, acknowledged: I was ‘forced to resort to psychic and later psychoanalytic treatment from my physical-therapeutic activity in the case of chronic physical illnesses’ (1917, p. 31). Since 1917, he advocated the possibility ‘to change the matter of das Es by psychic intervention, to use at least once this expression, the body of man’ (Groddeck, 1917, p. 42). To Groddeck, psychoanalysis should stimulate the ‘therapeutic factors of das Es’ to achieve a healing not as an amputation, but as a ‘restructuring of the organism’ (1917, p. 43).

It is not possible to make a simplistic comparison between Groddeck and Jung, also because Jung connected das Selbst to the principle of individuation, a developmental process of the personality, towards a specific theory of self-realization. His description of the psyche as a structure is autonomous and different from that of Freud. Such a situation does not concern Groddeck, who officially remained within a Freudian scheme. Nevertheless, as shown above, there are many analogies which depend on a similar conception of the unconscious to which these two pioneers have come through two parallel paths, but equally border: schizophrenia and organic pathologies.

Since 1993, I have highlighted are markable similarity between Groddeck and Jung, but on the subject I have not found articles until the fine observations by Dimitrijevic (2008, p. 141):

Groddeck’s theory of illness is closer to Jung’s than to any other psychoanalytic notion of that time. Although context, definitions, and interpretations may differ, the ‘keywords’ used by Groddeck and Jung are strikingly similar: rejection of the rule of the conscious; importance of symbols created in the unconscious; ‘purposivism’; undifferentiated life energy; vital forces; wholeness.

However, Dimitrijevic does not develop a comparison between their main concepts –Es and Selbst. These concepts have a central therapeutic role, too, as Groddeck (1929, p. 179) wrote about a patient’s Es: ‘his totality, physical and psychical, the universe which is himself, his microcosmos’ (see also Jelliffe, 1934, p. 455). Namely, an element that is added as a third to the ego-unconscious polarity and leads to the most radical consequences the relativization of consciousness, far beyond what stated by Freud’s psychoanalysis.

Freud, who took das Es from Groddeck, applied it differently and with this he imposed himself. Throughout his life, Groddeck complained of how much his thought was interpreted according to Freud’s term Es and therefore fundamentally misunderstood. This has not changed until today. (Will, 1985, pp. 160–161)

It is appropriate to reconsider this misunderstanding, which was certainly determined by Groddeck’s impossibility to retrieve his term to Freud’s authority in the psychoanalytic field (where Groddeck has never enjoyed a great favour) and personal factors must also be taken into account. Referring to Freud, his desire for the priority that we can see with Krüll (1979, chapter 4) related to the father problems that conditioned the founder of psychoanalysis in the relationship with the disciples. For Groddeck, his rejection of a rigorous language and the unresolved ambivalence towards his father-Freud was certainly an influence.

This ambivalence led Groddeck to obscure his Es without reacting officially to Freud and hiding the anger, that emerged instead in the letter written to his wife on 15 May 1923:

The Ego and the Id is pretty, but quite uninteresting for me. In reality it was written to appropriate secretly loans made by Stekel and me. And yet his Es is of only limited use for the understanding of neuroses. He ventures into the realm of organic illness only in a very sneaky way, with the help of a death instinct or destruction drive taken from Stekel and Spielrein. He disregards the constructive aspect of my Es, presumably to smuggle it in the next time. (Groddeck, quoted by Schacht, 1988, p. 13)

Georg Groddeck is difficult to place in the psychoanalytic movement, but also in the three categories of Freud followers envisaged by Krüll (1979): he cannot be included in the group of those who adhered unconditionally to his theories (such as the members of the Secret Committee), not even among the dissidents (e.g. Adler, Stekel, Jung) who broke with him. We could see Groddeck as a special case of those who succumbed to the conflict with Freud: because, while remaining linked to psychoanalysis, he did not
share the reductive conception of Freudian unconscious. However, Groddeck never claimed his positions to an open contrast to Freud, which could have caused a rupture in the way Fliess and Jung had done.

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC SELF AND GRODDECK’S RETURN

Groddeck’s ideas remained marginalized in the psychoanalytic field for a long time, until 1977 —43 years after his death— when something similar resurfaced, in English, and with the other term he himself used, through Kohut’s notion of self. The term ‘self’ had already been introduced into the theory of narcissism by Hartmann (1950) to include the whole person, therefore also the body -which, as we have seen above, did not fit in the concept of Es (Id) or ego, in the second Freudian topography. For many years, Kohut (1959) has carried out a clinical research with an approach marked by introspection and empathy, to the point of conceiving a new sector of psychoanalysis called ‘self psychology’. Eventually, in his book The Restoration of the Self, Kohut (1977) expanded the concept of self to define it as follows:

The center of the individual’s psychological universe, is, like all reality -physical reality (the data about the world perceived by our senses) or psychological reality (the data about the world perceived via introspection and empathy)- not knowable in its essence. We cannot, by introspection and empathy, penetrate to the self per se; only its introspectively or empathically perceived psychological manifestations are open to us. Demands for an exact definition of the nature of the self disregard the fact that “the self” is not a concept of an abstract science, but a generalization derived from empirical data. (1977, p. 311)

The perspective that emerges, according to Stolorow (1983, p. 287), diverges from classical metapsychology to a new theory ‘placing the experience of self at the center of psychoanalytic inquiry,’ constituting a new paradigm for psychoanalysis, characterized as ‘a developmental phenomenology of the self’. Wallerstein (1983, p. 313) recognizes the elaboration of a broader sense ‘of self as a suprordinate constellation, with the drives and defenses (the central ingredients of the classical psychoanalytical conceptions of psychic functioning) subsumed as constituents of this self.’ These aspects recall the self’s progressive development (like Jungian process of individuation) and the presence of a higher organizer of personality (not in Freud’s theory). Kohut (1977, pp. 94, 99, 135) refers to an ‘independent center of initiative’ and hypothesizes ‘that a rudimentary self is already present very early in life’ (p. 98) —‘a self which, while it includes drives (and/or defenses) in its organization, has become a suprordinate configuration whose significance transcends that of the sum of its parts’ (p. 97). It is thus possible to understand why Jacoby (1985, p. 72) asserts that Kohut’s self is close to the self of Jung’s psychology, but he gives an even more important consideration to totality. In fact, to Jacoby (1985, p. 63) the definition of Kohut’s self as the unknowable center of the psychological universe involves ‘the introduction of a Ganzheits psychology -of a psychology of psychic wholeness- into psychoanalysis.’

Poster (2009, p. 202) includes Heinz Kohut among the heirs of Ferenczi, who had developed theoretical aspects in a creative way and had carried out clinical experiments with Groddeck’s encouragement and support. Rudnytsky (2002, p. 122) asserts: ‘In Groddeck, Ferenczi found the unconditional acceptance that he never got from Freud,’ and Fromm (quoted by Poster, 2009, p. 196) even writes that ‘the development of Ferenczi can only be understood in light of Groddeck’s influence.’ Groddeck’s decisive influence on Ferenczi’s writings is now recognized (see Fortune, 2002). Indeed, by himself, Groddeck explored territories not reached by Freud -the pre-Oedipal period and a relational model of analytic technique, which introduced mothering. Moreover, Groddeck was the first to claim the importance of the female breast thus anticipating the theories by Klein, who was an analysand of Ferenczi (Hristeva & Poster, 2013, p. 245). Only very recent studies have been conducted demonstrating Groddeck’s influence on theories and clinical practice also of other important psychoanalysts10. However, at the time, there search emerging from Groddeck’s collaboration with Ferenczi was considered essentially schismatic and both fell into disgrace: they were considered odd or even mentally disturbed.11 Regarding the discredit, it is sufficient to express what Jones
wrote about Groddeck in a letter to Freud on 12 December 1928:

He has very little knowledge of ψα and it is a pity he was admitted to the movement, for he certainly does it more harm than good. It is plain to us that his philosophical id [Es] is little else than an introjected God. (Freud & Jones, 1993, p. 655)

This situation can explain why Kohut does not cite Groddeck and Ferenczi’s quotations are only occasional and without any particular importance. As for Jung, it is almost certain that Kohut did not know his theories. Therefore, it seems correct to support Jacoby’s (1985, p. 76) idea that Kohut’s clinical research was not influenced by Jung, although some of their conclusions are really alike -e.g. Kohut’s ‘grandiose self’ experience with respect to ‘inflation’ by Jung.

The fact remains that Kohut has brought back the concept of totality into psychoanalysis after its first appearance in Groddeck’s Es. Nevertheless, Kohut’s self is firmly placed in the psychoanalytic tradition: from a Jungian perspective it is basically personalistic and lacks ‘the wealth of symbolism and any direct reference to the religious experience which may be in he rent in the self as God-image’ (Jacoby, 1981, p.24). Symbolism and numinous that characterize Groddeck’s Es too.

In the psychoanalytic field, Groddeck has recently been recognized -some years later than Ferenczi (see Bonomi, 1999; Haynal, 2002)- above all for his pioneering contributions to the interpersonal and relational analytical technique, while there has not been much interest in his more theoretical themes, such as his conception of the unconscious and the meaning of illness. I agree with Dimitrijevic (2008, pp. 144–145) that the current technological trend of psychiatry goes in the opposite direction to that indicated by Groddeck, who was quite oriented to the search for internal causation. Even today, despite Kohut’s self psychology, psychoanalysis has left out Groddeck’s fundamental notions: among them, his most important -das Es. I explained above that this concept is akin to Jungian thought, mainly because Groddeck’s Es and Jung’s Selbst share a common cultural background -a very similar starting point with a prominent reference to Carus and Nietzsche, forerunners of the theory of the collective unconscious. Hence, Groddeck’s and Jung’s idea of a creative and compensatory unconscious emerges, but Huskinson points out that Nietzsche’s conception of the unconscious is different from the traditional one of Freud -as we have seen about the ‘general absolute unconscious’ by Carus- and it is right ‘that particular notion of an autonomous and collective unconscious that marks the very separation of Jungian “analytical psychology” from traditional “psychoanalysis”’ (Huskinson, 2004, p. 98). Further, by applying to Groddeck what Jung (1929a, para. 784) wrote for himself, that ‘essential differences in our basic assumptions’ led to different views from Freud, I deem that Groddeck’s Es should be placed in the Weltanschauung of analytical psychology and not in that of psychoanalysis.

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Volver a Bibliografía Georg Groddeck
Volver a Newsletter-13-ALSF
Notas al final

1.- Revised and expanded version of a paper first published as Balenci, M. (1993) ‘La storia dell’Es di Groddeck e il Sé junghiano’ [The story of the Es by Groddeck and the Jungian self], in (ed.) G. Antonelli, Forme del sapere in psicologia. Milan: Bompiani, pp. 169–183. Since the German word Es, in English translations, is rendered with ‘Id’ in the works of Freud and with ‘It’ in the writings of Groddeck, I preferred not to translate Es and not even Selbst (self) to make them visible in the text. I have also substituted these terms in the English translations (excluding the titles) just to point out the original reference, which is useful to the arguments discussed. About the problems of English translations of psychoanalytic terms and of Freud’s works, see Rycroft (1972, pp. 66 and 79); Bettelheim (1982) and Solms (1998).

2.- See Freud and Groddeck (1988, p. 87) and Schur (1972, p. 356 and the footnote about Groddeck’s assumption on Freud’s cancer in 1923).

3.- Linguistically it should be noted that, in German, Es expresses impersonality, while Selbst – used as a noun – means individuality: from this point of view they emphasize on different aspects of a psychic entity other than consciousness.

4.- Lewinter (1990, p. 15) finds in Spinoza’s Ethics the foundations of what he calls Groddeck’s ‘metaphysical “system”’.


6.- A term introduced by Nietzsche (1883) in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.

7.- Jung resumed from Bleuler (1925) the concept of die Psychoide, which defines the subcortical biological processes with adaptation function.


9.- Since July 1920, Groddeck was associated with the Psychoanalytic Society of Berlin.


12.- In Jung’s works we find the expression ‘personalistic psychology’ (also in reference to Adler and Freud) to understand a conception of psyche that is limited to the individual experience and does not take into account its collective contents. For a terminological clarification, see Baudouin (1975, p. 298).

13.- See Otto (1923).

14.- Both Jung and Freud explained their own Weltanschauung: see Jung (1928/1931) and Freud (1932–1933, lesson 35, pp. 157–182).